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HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AND
SEGREGATION IN AMERICA:
PROBLEMATICAL DIMENSIONS
AND THE FEDERAL
LEGAL RESPONSE*
Charles M. Lamb **
Legal scholars and social scientists have long been interested in civil
rights enforcement.' Their interest is partly reflected in research dealing
with the impact of judicial decisions. The impact approach has typically
been oriented toward determining the reasons for and the extent to which
there is compliance with the decisions of federal courts-especially those
of the United States Supreme Court.' The consensus emerging from this
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The author would like to express his appreciation to the Baldy Center for Law and Social
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article.
1. See, e.g., C. BULLOCK & H. RODGERS, RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA: IN SEARCH
OF AN UNFULFILLED GOAL (1975); G. ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? SEGREGATED SCHOOLS
AND NATIONAL POLICY 319-90 (1978); H. RODGERS AND C. BULLOCK, LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE: CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES (1972); Blumrosen, The Cross-
roads/or Equal Employment Opportunity.- Incisive Administration or Indecisive Bureaucracy?,
49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 46 (1973); Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword In De-
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Preferential Remedies/or Employment Discrimination, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1975); Fiss, The
Fate o/An Idea Whose Time Has Come.- Antidiscrimination Law in the Second Decade after
Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 742 (1974); Lamb & Lustig, The Burger
Court, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Activist-Restraint Debate, 40 U. PITr. L. REV. 169
(1979); Lamb, Administrative Coordination in Civil Rights Enforcement- .4 Regional Ap-
proach, 31 VAND. L. REV. 855 (1978); Lamb, Presidential Fair Housing Policies. Political and
Legal Trends, 8 CuM. L. REV. 619 (1978); Lamb, Presidential Leadershi, Governmental Re-
organization, and Equal Employment Opportunity, in EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR-RELATIONS
POLICY ch. 6 (C. Bulmer & J. Carmichael eds. 1980); Rubinowitz & Trosman, Affirmative
Action and the American Dream." Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeowner-
ship Programs, 74 Nw. U.L. REV.491 (1979); Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated Warth v.
Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373 (1978);
Taylor, Federal Civil Rights Laws.- Can They Be Made to Work?, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 971
(1971).
2. See, e.g., T. BECKER & M. FEELEY, THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS:
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work is that civil rights compliance has been minimized by widespread
intense local and state opposition, the infrequent use of severe sanctions,
and the weak organization and limited financing of civil rights groups.3
Attaining compliance with judicial decrees in geographic areas with high
minority populations, low incomes, and nearby recalcitrant jurisdictions
may also be more difficult.'
These impact studies have clearly advanced our understanding of com-
pliance with civil rights laws gained through the judicial process. Less at-
tention has been paid, however, to federal administrative enforcement
agencies that function in the crucial area between the courts on the one
hand, and those who must comply with the law on the other. The result of
focusing on the courts to the exclusion of other equally significant instru-
ments of civil rights compliance is an incomplete picture-"incomplete be-
cause the entire law enforcement process outside the courts is ignored."5
In the words of Bullock and Rogers, "[c]ourt decisions can, of course, pro-
pound universal standards. But in the absence of bureaucratic assistance in
implementation, enforcement is likely to remain sporadic for some time."6
What these authors wrote years ago rings equally true today.
A need still exists, therefore, for further research on federal bureaucratic
performance in antidiscrimination enforcement. After all, federal agencies
are obligated under law to exert-at least as a last alternative-the coer-
cion necessary to achieve compliance with the nation's civil rights laws.
When compared to litigation, enforcement by executive branch agencies
can be a more effective and timely means of gaining compliance.7 Hence,
the key to future compliance and enforcement does not lie primarily with
the courts. As has been observed, "rapid movement toward equality of the
races is not attainable through the judicial process."8 Instead, the degree
EMPIRICAL STUDIES (2d ed. 1973); S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES (1970); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, CustodialPolice
Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV.
1347 (1968); Specter, Mapp v. Ohio. Pandora's Problems for the Prosecutor, I I U. PA. L.
REV. 4 (1962); Interrogations in New Haven.- The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519
(1967).
3. S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 258-59
(2d ed. 1976). On organizational access and resources, see S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF
RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 124-30 (1974).
4. Bullock & Rodgers, Coercion to Compliance. Southern School Districts and School
Desegregation Guidelines, 38 J. POL. 987 (1976).
5. S. WASBY, supra note 2, at 147.
6. C. BULLOCK & H. RODGERS, supra note 1, at 47.
7. For a discussion of problems in the litigative approach, see S. SCHEINGOLD, supra
note 3, at 97-130.
8. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 113 (1970).
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of future civil rights compliance that the federal government will be able to
achieve depends mainly, although of course not exclusively, on upgrading
the effectiveness and efficiency of executive branch enforcement efforts.
The role of the executive branch becomes even more vital to the future of
civil rights enforcement in light of the Supreme Court's growing tendency
in recent years, since the advent of the Burger Court, to smile less favora-
bly on the claims of minorities than it did during the fifties and sixties
under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren.9
Without relying on the federal court system, civil rights compliance may
be secured through different administrative enforcement steps which vary
according to the laws involved and the agency regulations issued pursuant
to those laws. In Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"° for example,
there is no specific provision for judicial enforcement." Yet Title VI can
be a critical means for safeguarding civil rights because it prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in all programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance. Programs of all federal
agencies providing funds to state and local governments fall within the
requirements of Title VI, and a number of agencies have issued Title VI
regulations.' 2 Gaining voluntary compliance under Title VI normally in-
volves investigations by enforcement agencies, negotiations and concilia-
tion between parties, and agreement about plans to avoid future
discrimination. Where voluntary compliance efforts fail, federal agencies
may, within certain guidelines, act administratively to slow down or even
terminate federal assistance. If firmly implemented, Title VI actions by ad-
ministrative agencies seem to have a wider impact in protecting civil rights
than do decisions by the courts, and their impact is more direct and less
9. For leading examples of conservative civil rights decisions during the Burger years,
see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See also
Barker, Black Americans and the Burger Court: Implications for the Political System, 1973
WASH. U.L.Q. 747; Lamb & Lustig, supra note 1; Reid, Cast Aside the Burger Court. Blacks
in Quest of Justice and Education, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 105 (1973); Comment, Civil Rights
in the Burger Court Era, 10 AKRON L. REV. 327 (1976).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
11. As a last resort, however, Title VI agencies may refer cases to the Department of
Justice for law suits. For a discussion of this enforcement technique, see Bullock & Rodgers,
supra note 4, at 992.
12. See 6 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCE-
MENT EFFORT: To EXTEND FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE (I 975); Comment, Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964-Implementation and Impact, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824
(1968).
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time consuming.13 Similar enforcement actions to bring about compliance
can be taken under myriad other federal laws, including Title IX of the
Education Act Amendments of 1972,14 general revenue sharing, 5 and Ex-
ecutive Order 11,246 which prohibits employment discrimination in gov-
ernment contract work.
16
Even where the federal courts play an essential role in the enforcement
and compliance process, administrative actions in carrying out judicial
pronouncements have received too little attention in the literature. Years
ago Wasby detected this gap, writing that the "impact may be more greatly
affected by what those outside the [Supreme] Court do with the decision
than by the decision itself."'17 In other words, "[tihe effective law of the
land in any particular area of the country will be in part a result of the
amount of compliance granted to judicial decisions. If that is true, power
is less in the hands of the Supreme Court than in the hands of those who
legitimate the [Court's] decisions."'" Further, "the more persistent the 'en-
forcers' are, the greater the compliance.""' In the area of school desegre-
gation, for instance, school boards "may be tempted to challenge the
policy if they are not fully certain that it will be enforced or that noncom-
pliance will be met only with a reprimand and no severe sanction. '"20 In
short, civil rights enforcement has two faces. One involves the formal laws
and judicial rulings requiring nondiscrimination in areas such as housing,
education, and employment. The other is the face of reality: the fact that
those laws have not been fully implemented.
The purpose of this article is two-fold, both aspects of which directly
relate to the discrepancy between legal formality (what the law says) and
legal reality (how the law takes effect through enforcement) in the field of
fair housing. The general theme of the first section is that a national dis-
grace stares us in the face and should be obvious to all. The housing con-
ditions with which most minorities must contend on a daily basis should
not and cannot be countenanced in a democratic society that professes to
be responsive to the most fundamental and pressing needs of its citizens.
Through the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968,21 Congress
pledged itself to the goal of "decent" housing for all Americans within a
13. See To EXTEND FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 12, at 16-24.
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
15. 31 U.S.C. § 1242(a) (1976).
16. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
17. S. WASBY, supra note 2, at 257.
18. Id at 21-22 (emphasis in original).
19. Id at 258.
20. Id at 46.
21. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 3601-3631 (1976)).
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decade. But thirteen years later little progress has been made toward that
goal in terms of the quality and quantity of housing available to most mi-
norities. Progress has not been forthcoming to a large extent because the
problems associated with housing discrimination and segregation persist,
with little relief in sight. Some major aspects of these problems are there-
fore surveyed in the first section. A number of objective studies are drawn
upon in that discussion. From these studies it becomes clear that the
problems of housing polarization and discrimination in America need not
be exaggerated even so slightly; the facts are obvious and speak for them-
selves.
The second section examines in a unique way the overwhelming failure
of the federal government's enforcement agencies to implement effectively
the nation's fair housing statutes, and the federal court opinions and exec-
utive orders reinforcing those laws. The approach here is unique in the
sense that fair housing enforcement is analyzed in terms of nine carefully
selected variables that affect fair housing implementation. By focusing on
these variables, it is argued that we are actually assessing in a systematic
manner the ways that the legal system has or should have responded to
housing segregation and discrimination. These variables, in summary
form, include the role of active federal involvement and enforcement
agencies in the implementation process; whether legal policy goals are
clearly stated and precise standards are established for measuring compli-
ance; the commitment of administrative personnel and their superiors in
promoting fair housing enforcement; the extent to which implementation
is administratively coordinated; whether the advantages of complying with
fair housing policies and laws outweigh related costs; and the attitudes of,
and actions taken by, those who benefit from effective fair housing en-
forcement.22
22. It should be noted at the outset that some may object to the relatively frequent
reliance in section two on reports issued by the United States Commission on Civil Rights.
However, I am thoroughly satisfied, after spending 1975 through 1977 with that agency as a
fair housing specialist, that the findings of the Commission's fair housing research have been
accurate assessments of the dilemmas that this country has experienced in the past and still
encounters today. Indeed, I seriously doubt that academics can conduct a substantially
higher quality of research than is typically released in various reports each year by the Civil
Rights Commission. All federal agencies are required to provide the Commission with com-
plete information regarding their fair housing implementation activities. I firmly believe
that Commission-obtained data are more extensive and valid than any other available, and
therefore I have not been reluctant to draw upon it freely in section two.
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I. DISCRIMINATION AND SEGREGATION IN HOUSING: THE MULTIPLE
DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
One has only to drive in and around most large and medium-sized
American cities to discover notable differences in neighborhoods. They
will vary according to wealth, employment opportunities, law enforce-
ment, educational and transportation systems, medical and recreational fa-
cilities, and various public accommodations, among other things. Yet
perhaps most obvious are differences in the racial compositions of these
neighborhoods-segregation and polarization that are due in large meas-
ure to past and present housing discrimination. Housing segregation is not
a "natural development." Rather, it emerges largely from conscious and
deliberate actions on the part of local governments, real estate interests,
financial institutions, and white homeowners to keep minorities outside
white community environs. And of course the problem is nothing new.
Far from it. "What is new is the scale of the phenomenon and the wide-
spread public recognition of this reality and its disastrous consequences."
23
In order to understand fair housing enforcement, it is necessary to have
firmly fixed in mind the fundamental dimensions and characteristics of
housing discrimination and segregation in the United States. This subject
has numerous facets, but the following eight are most crucial. First, fair
housing constitutes one of the most controversial, emotional issues in
American law and politics. Second, whites believe that they gain from
continued segregated housing, and in some ways they do. Third, as a re-
sult of the first two factors, this nation has a long history of residential
discrimination and segregation which became most widespread with the
great migrations of blacks from the South after World War I. Fourth, var-
ious zoning, land use, and growth control devices have been widely
adopted and have the effect of keeping minorities out of white communi-
ties. Fifth, housing segregation leads to a number of intolerable living
conditions and injustices being forced upon minorities which should be
corrected by the legal and political systems. Sixth, housing segregation
contributes to a vicious circle of discrimination that includes not only
housing but also education and employment. Seventh, policies of the fed-
eral government have accomplished relatively little toward ensuring equal
housing opportunity and, in fact, have contributed to housing segregation
in some instances. And finally, although not totally unrelated to the pre-
ceding point, there continues to be a dual housing market in the United
States, and practices such as steering, blockbusting, and redlining, which
23. L. RUBINOWITZ, Low-INCOME HOUSING: SUBURBAN STRATEGIES 2 (1974).
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the federal government allows to persist, should be eliminated through le-
gal action. Each of these points will now be elaborated upon.
A. Emotions and Controversy
It does not require a great deal of insight to conclude that more contro-
versy and emotions are bound up in the question of fair or open housing
than any other area in civil rights. This is why the Fair Housing Act of
1968 was "the result of a political compromise, a product more of the de-
sire for passage than the desire for a rational scheme for uprooting dis-
crimination."24 Political research has keyed in on the controversial,
emotional traits of the fair housing question. After studying the defeat of
open housing referenda, for example, Hamilton could conclude with confi-
dence that "the referendum poses starkly what is perhaps the most funda-
mental and emotionally charged issue in domestic policy," and that
"[o]pen housing indubitably generates more involvement than local poli-
tics normally.",2
5
As a result of the emotional nature of the fair housing issue, predomi-
nantly white communities throughout the nation have adopted exclusion-
ary devices and practices which have the intent or the effect of keeping
minorities out of their neighborhoods. 26 It is thus a simple fact of Ameri-
can politics, law, and psychology that whites are more opposed to living in
an integrated neighborhood than they are to working with, or having their
children go to school with, minorities.27 "Attitudes toward residential in-
24. Note, Discrimination in Employment and Housing.- Private Enforcement of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834, 835 (1969). The Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § § 3601-3631 (1976), has always been considered a weak piece of legislation. Dur-
ing 1979 and 1980, attempts were made to strengthen the enforcement provisions of the Act.
However, this movement was stifled in the U.S. Senate in December, 1980. See Tolchin, Bill
to Strengthen Fair Housing Act Killed as Senate Cloture Vote Fails, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10,
1980, § B, at 8, col. 3.
25. Hamilton, Direct Legislation.- Some Implications of Fair Housing Referenda, 64 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 124, 127 (1970). Eley and Casstevens agree: "Fair-housing laws certainly
appear to be the most sensitive and explosive political issue in the civil-rights revolution in
the North." L. ELEY & T. CASSTEVENS, THE POLITICS OF FAIR-HOUSING LEGISLATION:
STATE AND LOCAL CASE STUDIES 6 (1968). See also Silverman, Homeownershi for the
Poor- Subsidies and Racial Segregation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 72, 97 (1974).
26. See generally M. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION (1976); A. DowNs,
OPENING UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR AMERICA (1973).
27. See, e.g., Harris, Majority Sees Racial Bias in Housing, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1973,
§ A, at 4, col. 1. This survey found that half of all white respondents were aware of housing
discrimination against blacks and that it is more commonplace than employment or educa-
tional discrimination. Eley and Casstevens explain white opposition to housing desegrega-
tion both in terms of emotions and property Values:
One may speculate that [the emotion involved in housing desegregation is] be-
cause of white America's historic prejudice against Negroes. Most whites simply
1981]
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tegration appear to occupy a peculiar position in 'the rank order of dis-
crimination' . . . because of the implications for intimacy of personal
association that residential integration has for many people."28
Residing in a neighborhood with just a small number of minorities, par-
ticularly if they live nearby, conjures up images of unwanted social con-
tact-of white children playing and developing close friendships with
those of another race. For most whites, I daresay, this is indeed a taboo-
something to be avoided at almost any cost. 29 Furthermore, in the minds
of many whites, there may well exist the belief that interracial marriages
are more likely to occur where children are raised in mixed neighbor-
hoods. These factors, when taken as a whole, have led to violence when
minorities have sought to move into white areas. In some cases, little or no
police protection has been afforded new residents.3" The emotions and
controversy involved therefore dictate that less progress has been made in
fair housing than in any other civil rights field.3' Fair housing is in fact the
last frontier, the area in which progress is slowest and genuine change most
remote.
B. Publicly Perceived Gains of Segregation
There are at least two principal benefits that whites gain, or perceive that
do not want Negroes living next door or in white neighborhoods. Buttressing this
prejudice is the traditional American view of the rights of private individuals to
own and control the use and disposition of property. Fair-housing laws transfer
the integration issue from schools and the voting booth to the much more personal
arena of one's own home and the house next door. Americans have historically
thought of the authority of the state as ceasing at the doorstep of the home. In-
deed, many Americans have regarded this operating principle not only as a basic
right, but also as a chief reason for our national progress. Reinforcing white
America's dedication to the abstract principle of property rights-and perhaps un-
derlying it-has been the firm belief that racial integration in housing depresses
property values....
Small wonder, then, that laws whose avowed purpose is the control and elimina-
tion of racial prejudice in private housing have provoked long and bitter social
controversy and conflict. In the circumstances, it has not been easy for many of us
to see that our history has also operated to deny Negroes equal rights to housing of
their choosing. We are ready to protect our own cherished property rights at a
moment's notice, but we have been largely indifferent to fellow Americans whose
property rights scarcely exist.
L. ELEY & T. CASSTEVENS, supra note 25, at 6-7.
28. Wolfinger & Greenstein, The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysi of
Referendum Voting, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 753, 765 (1968).
29. See text accompanying note 63 infra.
30. See, e.g., M. MEYERSON, B. TERRENT & W. WHEATON, HOUSING, PEOPLE AND
CITIES 76-77 (1962); Orfield, Federal Policy, Local Power, and Metropolitan Segregation, 89
POL. Sci. Q. 777, 784, 787 (1974); Silverman, supra note 25, at 82.
31. H. RODGERS & C. BULLOCK, supra note 1, at 196.
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they gain, as a result of housing segregation. One is psychological; the
other economic.32 At the most elementary level, as suggested above, psy-
chological rewards can for the most part be translated as overt or covert
racist attitudes. Through polarized housing patterns, many whites "are
reassured that there is someone beneath them on the social ladder."33
Their egos are inflated by knowing that some group cannot enter the
pearly gates of their white neighborhoods. "The insecure use prejudice as a
defense mechanism; they feel more important when they can look down on
someone else."34 Hence, psychological considerations, although difficult
to measure, explain to a certain degree the phenomena of "white flight"
and the incorporation of a large number of white suburbs surrounding
most major cities across the nation.35 And "once ensconced in their subur-
ban havens, members of the middle class have erected walls and moats to
keep out the unwelcome features of the central city and to protect their
suburban turf."36
Whites also wish to protect their suburbs from "infiltration" or "inva-
sion" in large part for economic reasons which may play a more critical
role than psychology in maintaining our segregated society. Those ex-
cluded from comfortable suburbia in the early 1970s often had incomes of
$10,000 or more and were predominantly black.37 Because of these "unde-
sirable" people and "undesirable" subsidized housing, real estate agents,
financial lending institutions, and local governmental officials are preoccu-
pied with the notion that the entry of minorities into white communities
will inevitably cause property values to plummet.38 For at least twenty
32. See, e.g., C. BULLOCK & H. RODGERS, supra note 1, at 5-6; A. DOWNS, URBAN
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 91-96 (1970); Silverman, supra note 25, at 83.
33. C. BULLOCK & H. RODGERS, supra note 1, at 6.
34. J. HECHT, BECAUSE IT Is RIGHT: INTEGRATION IN HOUSING 19 (1970).
35. See generally M. DANIELSON, supra note 26. The growth of suburbs around large
cities is a twentieth century phenomenon. During the last century annexation of surround-
ing areas by expanding cities was relatively common. In turn, middle-class residents on the
peripheries sought to keep control of local services, to avoid higher taxes, and to exclude
unwanted classes of persons by incorporating suburbs. By 1930, cities throughout the coun-
try,.with the exception of the South, were surrounded by independent suburbs. 'Id at 15-18.
These suburbs have flourished since then, usually seeking to maintain stable population
characteristics in terms of race and income levels. Id
36. C. HAAR & D. IATRIDIS, HOUSING THE POOR IN SUBURBIA: PUBLIC POLICY AT THE
GRASS ROOTS 10 (1974).
37. L. RUBINOWITZ, supra note 23. See also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA 4 (1974).
38. See R. HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS
(1969); Orfield, supra note 30, at 786; Note, Racial Steering. The Real Estate Broker and Title
VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808 (1976). The role of the real estate agent has been particularly impor-
tant in maintaining segregated housing.
Over the past few decades the real estate industry has played a leading role in
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years, research has nevertheless demonstrated that this widely held belief
is largely a myth.39 Yet the myth can become a self-fulfilling prophecy:
panic selling by whites leads to an increased supply of housing in white
neighborhoods, which naturally results in a decline in the prices of
homes.40 Also, it is frequently forgotten that the relatively few minority
families able to move into better white communities do so because they
can afford it. They are families with an economic status generally equal to
that of white residents.4 ' But, as the famous research of the Taeubers indi-
cates, "[e]conomic factors. . . cannot account for more than a small por-
tion of observed levels of racial residential segregation. Regardless of their
economic status, Negroes rarely live in 'white' residential areas, while
whites, no matter how poor, rarely live in 'Negro' residential areas." 2 The
United States Commission on Civil Rights has added that:
[f]or blacks to have incomes equal to whites would not in and
of itself solve the problem [of housing segregation]. This would
creating and maintaining segregated neighborhoods. The marketing practices of
real estate brokers are an important factor in determining the availability of hous-
ing in the suburban market to minority buyers. Both sellers and buyers depend
extensively on a broker's advice and sales methods.
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 37, at 16. Moreover, "[t]he importance of
the broker's practices is that they affect home buyers on a much larger scale than individual
discriminatory practices ever can achieve." Id. Thus, the Commission on Civil Rights has
concluded that:
The more general view ... among realtors is that the maintenance of a dual
housing market is more profitable than creating an integrated one. Economic
motivations play a large part in determining racial practices in the real estate busi-
ness....
Substantial pressure not to "rock the boat" comes from within the industry.
Real estate brokers sometimes perpetuate a dual housing market by punishing
those white brokers who are willing to sell to blacks in white areas, thus keeping
them in line.
Id at 20. L. ELEY AND T. CASSTEVENS, supra note 25, at 7, add that:
Real estate brokers have been the group most stubbornly opposed to fair-housing
laws. For some years now they have labeled the legislation "forced-housing laws,"
charging that by this means the state is infringing on property rights by forcing
people to dispose of their housing to persons they would not ordinarily choose. By
and large, realtors would rather have Negroes discriminated against, and even seg-
regated, than have the authority of the state employed to enable Negroes to obtain
housing outside the ghetto.
39. See L. LAURENTI, PROPERTY VALUES AND RACE (1960); Ladd, Effect of Integration
on Property Values, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 801 (1962). See generally S. BERGER, SOCIAL CON-
SEQUENCES OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION OF THE URBAN AMERICAN NEGRO 25 (1970).
40. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supranote 37, at 22.
41. S. BERGER, supra note 39, at 26; Farley, Residential Segregation and Its Implications
for School Integration, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 165, 167, 174-75 (1975).
42. K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES: RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND
NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE 2-3 (1965).
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only lower the percentage of black metropolitan residents who
live in central cities (in areas of one million or more population)
from 81.1 to 78.4.
At every income level whites are more likely than blacks to live
in suburbia. In 1970, 85.5 per cent of black metropolitan families
earning less than $4,000 lived in the central city, as compared
with 46.4 per cent of white families in the same income range. In
the $4,000 to $10,000 income range, 82.5 per cent of the black
families and 41.6 per cent of the white families lived in the cen-
tral city. For families with an annual income of $10,000 or more,
the central city figures are 76.8 per cent black and 30.9 per cent
white.43
In short, although minorities have made substantial economic and employ-
ment progress since World War 11,44 they are still chiefly restricted to
"their own" neighborhoods.
45
Before leaving these economic considerations, one point needs to be un-
derscored: in some cases whites actually pay high costs for housing segre-
gation and discrimination. These costs, for example, are reflected in
heavier tax burdens, the growth of crime and juvenile delinquency that
increasingly affects our suburbs as well as our cities, and the gradual decay
of our leading metropolitan and cultural centers nationwide.4 6 "A differ-
ent (cost] is that preoccupation with racial issues will so exhaust the ener-
gies of top public administrators that other problems, such as education,
housing, transportation and pollution, will receive inadequate attention. 47
And, to be sure, as much as one would regret to see it, there is always the
possibility of future racial riots, similar to those experienced in the 1960s,
and the accompanying destruction of property owned principally by white
businesspersons. The flare-ups of 1980 in Miami may only be a preface of
things to come in other sections of the country unless the legal system ful-
fills its long-standing promise of racial equality and true equal opportu-
nity.48
43. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 37, at 4.
44. See, e.g., Farley, Trends in Racial Inequalities.- Have the Gains offthe 1960s Disap-
peared in the 1970s? 42 AM. Soc. REV. 189 (1977); McCrone & Hardy, Civil Rights Policies
and Achievement of Racial Economic Equality, 1948-1975, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1 (1978).
45. See, e.g., A. SORENSEN, K, TAEUBER & L. HOLLINGSWORTH, INDEXES OF RACIAL
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION FOR 109 CITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1974).
46. S. BERGER, supra note 39, at 18.
47. Id
48. On the recent racial problems in Miami, see Fire and Fury in Miami, TIME, June 2,
1980, at 10-14, 19.
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C The "Great Migration" and Resulting Segregation
Due to perceived psychological and economic gains, and other factors
such as overt prejudice and discrimination by real estate agents, homeown-
ers, financial institutions, and local governments, housing discrimination
and segregation have always existed in the United States. Historically this
discrimination became more obvious with the migration of blacks from the
South after World War I. "A movement of Negroes toward the North and
the cities was developing early in the twentieth century, but events of the
second decade of the century gave impetus to the movement and trans-
formed it into one of the major migrative streams in the nation's his-
tory."49 That migration has been explained in economic terms. During
the twenties there was significant economic growth in the North and East.
"The resulting job opportunities, plus the ravage of the boll weevil in the
South, encouraged a continuation of The Great Migration, and Negroes
responded by moving northward in record numbers.""
These migratory shifts had a profound and lasting influence on the dis-
tribution of the black population, particularly in urban areas and central
cities. Hauser has described various facets of this crucially important
movement most carefully and thoroughly:
In 1910, before large migratory streams of Negroes left the
South, 73 per cent of the Negroes in the nation, as compared with
52 per cent of the whites, lived in rural areas, that is, on farms
and in areas with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants. By 1960, the dis-
tribution of Negroes by urban-rural residence had become com-
pletely reversed, with 73 per cent of the Negro population
residing in urban areas. Thus, within a period of fifty years, less
than a lifetime, the Negro has been transformed from a predomi-
nantly rural to a predominantly urban resident. In fact, in 1960,
Negroes were more highly urbanized than whites, 70 per cent of
whom resided in urban areas.
The great increase in the concentration of Negroes is even
more dramatically revealed by analysis of their metropolitaniza-
tion. In 1910, only 29 per cent of Negroes lived in Standard Met-
ropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's). By 1960, the concentration
of Negroes in SMSA's had increased to 65 per cent. Between
1920 and 1940, Negroes in SMSA's increased by 65 per cent as
compared with 36 per cent for whites; and, between 1940 and
1960, Negroes in metropolitan areas more than doubled, increas-
ing by 109 per cent, as compared with 50 per cent for whites.
49. K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, supra note 42, at 11-12.
50. R. FORMAN, BLACK GHETTOS, WHITE GHETTOS, AND SLUMS 18 (1970).
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Even more striking than the increase of Negroes in metropoli-
tan areas is their concentration in the central cities of these areas.
Between 1910 and 1920, the Negro population in central cities of
metropolitan areas increased by 40 per cent; between 1920 and
1940, by 83 per cent; and between 1940 and 1960, by 123 per cent.
Hence, by 1960, 51 per cent of all Negroes in the United States
lived in the central cities of SMSA's. Of all Negroes resident in
metropolitan areas, 80 per cent lived in central cities. There was
a much higher concentration of Negroes in metropolitan areas
and in their central cities in the North and West than in the
South. In 1960, of all Negroes in the North 93 per cent were in
SMSA's and 79 per cent in the central cities; and in the West 93
per cent in SMSA's and 67 per cent in central cities. . . . In the
South, however, 46 per cent of all Negro residents lived in
SMSA's and 34 per cent in central cities. The twenty-four
SMSA's with 1 million or more persons in 1960 contained 38 per
cent of the total Negro population, and their central cities, 31 per
cent. Comparable figures for whites are 34 and 15 per cent.'
As a result of huge waves of blacks moving to large metropolitan centers
outside the South, housing segregation became especially pervasive against
blacks.52 "The development of a physical ghetto . . . was not the result
chiefly of poverty; nor did Negroes cluster out of choice."53 There is in-
deed a general consensus that blacks have been forced into the position of
being the most residentially isolated large minority group in America.5 4
51. Hauser, Demographic Factors in the Integration of the Negro, 94 DAEDALUS 851-52
(1965). See also S. BERGER, SUpra note 39, at 21; R. FORMAN, rupra note 50, at 19. It should
be emphasized, too, that black migrations to the North caused new social issues and dynam-
ics:
As Negroes moved into Northern cities from the rural South, the race problem
ceased being merely sectional and became a matter of national concern. If any-
thing, the difficulties were greater in the North than in the South. Above the Ma-
son-Dixon line there were no established customs or mores restricting race
relations. The great Negro migrations of World War I and periods following
raised new questions in the North. The answers, however, were old ones. South-
ern attitudes toward the Negro were easily adopted in the North, and their effect,
untempered by tradition, thoroughly insulated the races from each other as huge
colored districts of New York, Chicago, St. Louis, and Detroit developed. There
the separation of the races was even more complete than in the South.
C. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE
COVENANT CASES 9 (1959).
52. R. FORMAN, supra note 50, at 19.
53. A. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO 26 (1967).
54. See, e.g., S. BERGER, supra note 39, at 21. Berger's research indicates that whites
and blacks in urban areas live in completely different neighborhoods for the most part, and
that a very high degree of residential segregation holds true for cities in all regions of the
nation and for all types of cities-large and small, industrial and commercial, central and
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While there are exceptions, the trend, particularly since the 1950s, has
been that as more minorities move into the cities, white flight has acceler-
ated and surrounding white suburbs have sprung up like mushrooms.5
Thus, in the 1960s, housing segregation increased even over previous de-
cades. During the decade of the sixties, for example, the white population
in central cities of at least 500,000 decreased by 1.9 million, whereas the
black population rose by 2.8 million. In contrast, these cities' suburbs
gained 12.5 million whites but only 0.8 million blacks.56 "In terms of per-
centage changes, the increase in the black share of the central city popula-
tion was two and one-fourth times as great as the increase in the black
share of total metropolitan population in these areas., 57 Recent statistical
studies on housing patterns support this view and demonstrate that polari-
zation by race remained a basic metropolitan trend during the 1970s. 8
Although blatant discriminatory practices in housing are not as common
today as they were prior to the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 59
a great deal of research documents the fact that discriminatory attitudes
and accompanying policies have been and still are a chief cause for the
lack of deconcentration of minorities throughout white residential areas, 60
suburban. This fact also holds true regardless of the respective proportions of black and
white populations, regardless of the relative economic status of the black and white resi-
dents, and regardless of the character of local laws and policies. Id
55. See, e.g., M. DANIELSON, supra note 26, at ch. 2; C. HAAR & D. IATRIDIS, supra note
36, at 9-10.
56. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 37, at 4.
57. Id One year later the Commission on Civil Rights concluded that, during the dec-
ade of the sixties, central cities grew by almost three million blacks and lost some two mil-
lion whites. By contrast, the suburban population gained 12.5 million whites but only one
million blacks. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN:
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 5 (1975). It should be noted, however, that generaliza-
tions about central cities and suburbs are inapplicable in some cases. Research has mostly
focused on Northeastern and Midwestern cities that are older and more densely populated.
Housing patterns may vary some~vhat in the South and parts of the West. See EQUAL OP-
PONTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 37, at 7.
58. See, e.g., D. FALK & H. FRANKLIN, EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY: THE UNFIN-
ISHED AGENDA 2-4 (1976); A. SORENSEN, K. TAEUBER & L. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note
45, at 1; Clemence, Residential Segregation in the Mid-Sixties, 4 DEMOGRAPHY 562 (1967);
Farley, supra note 41, at 165; Farley & Taeuber, Population Trends and Residential Segrega-
tion since 1960, 159 ScI. 953 (1968).
59. 42 U.S.C. § § 3601-3631 (1976).
60. See, e.g., K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, supra note 42; C. VOSE, supra note 51; Foley,
Institutional and Contextual Factors Affecting the Housing Choices of Minority Residents, in
SEGREGATION IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS: PAPERS ON RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS
IN CHOICE OF HOUSING 85 (A. Hawley & V. Rock eds. 1973); Farley, Bianchi & Colasanto,
Barriers to the Racial Integration of Neighborhoods.- The Detroit Case, 441 ANNALS 97
(1979); Farley, Schuman, Bianchi, Colsanto & Hatchett, "Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs"
Will the Trend Toward Racially Separate Communities Continue? 7 Soc. ScI. PROB. 319
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and that minorities are understandably upset with residential segrega-
tion.6' One study published in 1978 has demonstrated that resistance by
whites to housing desegregation has far more explanatory power for con-
tinued racial separation than either the economic status of blacks or the
notion that blacks prefer to live together in the same communities.62
White resistance to mixed neighborhoods is very evident. Even
in the situation of minimum integration-one black and 14 white
families-one-quarter of the whites claimed they would be un-
comfortable. As the proportion of blacks rose, so too did discom-
fort among whites. In a neighborhood which was half black, 72%
of the whites said they would be uncomfortable.
We asked those white respondents who reported being uncom-
fortable in a neighborhood whether they would actually try to
move out. . . . This proportion was quite low for the neighbor-
hood which contains one black family-only 7% of the whites
would try to leave-but increases rapidly. Forty percent said
they would move away from the neighborhood which is one-
third black and 64% would leave the majority black area.6 3
An equally revealing study was sponsored in 1978 by the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in forty major
metropolitan areas. It showed that despite the relatively large number of
federal statutes, court decisions, and executive orders making housing dis-
crimination illegal, in 29.1 percent of all instances where blacks sought to
rent housing, they were discriminated against.64 The comparable figure
for discrimination in the selling of homes to blacks was 21.5 percent.65
Second, it was found that when blacks contacted four different real estate
agents, there was a seventy-five percent chance of encountering discrimi-
nation in rentals and a sixty-three percent chance in sales.66 Third, the
study examined the process of "steering"-the tendency of real estate
agents to show persons property for rent and sale only or primarily in
(1978); Kain & Quigley, Housing Market Discrimination, Homeownership, and Savings Be-
havior, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 263 (1972).
61. 0. DUNCAN, H. SCHUMAN & B. DUNCAN, SOCIAL CHANGE IN A METROPOLITAN
COMMUNITY 108 (1973); Pettigrew, Attitudes on Race and Housing: A Social-Psychological
View, reprinted in A. HAWLEY & V. ROCK, supra note 60.
62. Farley, Schuman, Bianchi, Colsanto & Hatchett, supra note 60.
63. Id at 333, 336.
64. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979. Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1979). The complete
results of this research are found in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT, MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING MARKETS: THE
HOUSING MARKET PRACTICES SURVEY (1979).
65. Hearings, supra note 64, at 165.
66. Id
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neighborhoods in which their racial group is already dominant. The study
found that steering "is probably the single most widely practiced form of
racial discrimination in the sales market, '67 but the extent to which steer-
ing occurs is not included in the above figures on discrimination.68 Per-
haps most significantly, the data on steering indicated "that equal
treatment was accorded to whites and blacks in only 30 percent of [the
cases] in the rental market and in only 10 percent in the sales market. 6 9
In other words, as of 1978, seventy percent of all whites and blacks in forty
major American cities were steered into "their own" neighborhoods where
rental property was being sought and in ninety percent of all cases where
the aim was to purchase housing! This is not, needless to say, equal oppor-
tunity to housing-not by a far cry.
Also worthy of note are the extensive, almost revolutionary changes in
population distribution that would be required to bring about a desegre-
gated society. In 1975, in the nation's fifteen largest metropolitan areas,
seventy-five to ninety-seven percent "of either the white or the black popu-
lation would have [had] to shift their places of residence to bring about
complete integration., 70 Another rather astonishing estimation was pro-
jected in 1970: "An average of 86 percent of the non-white population in
'207 cities around the country would have to be redistributed in order to
eliminate residential segregation."'"
Through what legal and extralegal means has our society's housing pic-
ture been continually stratified along racial lines? The restrictive covenant
was probably the first formal procedure used to promote and maintain
housing segregation, 72 but there have subsequently developed many other
67. Id.
68. Id
69. Id at 166.
70. Farley, supra note 41, at 165.
71. S. BERGER, supra note 39, at 21.
72. C. VOSE, supra note 51, at 5. Vose notes that:
[a]lthough the generic name of restrictive covenant covered all devices which
aimed at limiting the sale or rental of property, two distinct types of devices were
used to keep property out of the hands of Negroes. Restrictions might be placed in
title deeds or signed as a separate agreement quite apart from the actual property
titles.
Id at 7. After restrictive covenants were prohibited through state enforcement in Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), white property owners developed organizations to maintain
segregation privately:
Neighborhood property associations functioned in Los Angeles, Chicago, New
York, Detroit, Baltimore, St. Louis, Washington, and other cities. They drafted
restrictions, had them officially recorded and guarded against violations. These
associations usually worked closely with organized real-estate interests within each
city to prevent sale of covenanted property to Negroes. Out of deference to these
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discriminatory practices. After a survey of the literature and past legal
trends, one recently assembled list of the most common forms of housing
discrimination in the twentieth century suggests that several basic forms of
discrimination have been relied upon to hold suburban racial and income
characteristics static. In addition to restrictive covenants, these have in-
cluded zoning ordinances based upon race, "[1]ocal condemnation of land
occupied by minority groups in suburbs or land slated for minority or inte-
grated housing;" excluding federally subsidized housing by local commu-
nities through a broad range of devices; discrimination by financial
lending institutions; discriminatory mortgage and loan policies by the Fed-
eral Housing Administration of HUD and the Veterans Administration;
the lack of effective police protection for minorities who move into white
neighborhoods; and the "[u]se of subsidized housing programs in ways
that intensify segregation and destablize integrated neighborhoods."73 Ad-
ditionally,
[i]nformation concerning housing opportunities usually is not
available to blacks and whites on the same basis. . . . Blacks are
more likely to face limitations on credit, or are unable to secure
mortgages if they seek housing outside "black" areas. Opportuni-
ties normally available to whites, such as second mortgages or
flexibility in meeting contract deadlines, are frequently withheld
from blacks.74
These and other discriminatory practices are further explored later in this
article.75
D. Land Use, Zoning, and Growth Control Planning
At the outset it should be emphasized that zoning, land use, and growth
control planning are not inherently "bad." To the contrary, they are essen-
tial. However, they become "bad" when deliberately employed to have
the effect of excluding those who could otherwise move into a community
and wish to do so, but are denied that right. The fact is that "nearly every
powers, local newspapers refused advertisements offering to sell real estate in white
areas to Negroes. Individual owners were implored not to sell to colored people.
When these informal means failed, the white property-owners' groups, called vari-
ously protective, improvement, or citizens' associations, brought legal action and
gained injunctions from courts which forbade violators from owning or using par-
ticular property. Their success in gaining enforcement of these privately drawn
covenants developed patterns of racial segregation in northern cities.
C. VOSE, supra note 51, at 250.
73. G. ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 409. See also H. RODGERS & C. BULLOCK, supra note
1, at 141-46.
74. M. DANIELSON, supra note 26, at 12.
75. See text accompanying notes 143-93 infra.
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land use control entails some exclusion, even if indirectly, by raising the
costs that the market would otherwise charge."7 6 Thus, piecemeal govern-
mental planning of land usage for residential, commercial, and industrial
purposes is a thoroughly legitimate legal and social problem that must be
resolved-provided, again, that it does not work to the complete disadvan-
tage of minorities seeking decent housing in urban and suburban areas.
Much American land, of course, was cleared, settled, and used for vari-
ous purposes decades ago. Yet not until this century's rapidly spreading
urbanization and industrialization did the importance of regulating growth
and land use become clearly apparent. Reasons for concern surround the
urban and suburban citizen and are becoming more evident to those af-
fected in nearby rural and semi-rural communities. Uncontrolled large-
scale development, demands for additional public services to meet escalat-
ing growth, rising taxes, suburban sprawl, deterioration of the environ-
ment, traffic congestion, and myriad related growth traits significantly
impinge upon the quality of urban and suburban life."7
The 1970s therefore witnessed the emergence of no-growth movements
throughout the nation.78 Many suburban communities established new
zoning regulations and building codes. Apart from, or in combination
with exclusionary devices, suburbs also adopted local moratoria on the
construction of low-income housing, forbade the use of mobile homes,
blocked sewage development, and prevented additional commercial and
industrial build-up. Perhaps most local no-growth plans were not in-
tended to exclude minorities. Most may have been natural and predictable
reactions to spreading urbanization and industrialization. It should be self-
evident, however, that there is an unfortunate but seemingly unavoidable
conflict between the apostles of growth controls and ecology on the one
hand, and those who advocate open housing on the other:
Emphasizing "proper ecological study" and the misuse of legit-
imate ecological concerns. . . oversimplifies the inherent conflict
between the goals of the environmental and open-housing move-
ments. Preserving the environment through the regulation of
growth cannot be fully compatible with expanding housing op-
76. C. HAAR & D. IATRIDIS, supra note 36, at 15 (emphasis added).
77. See generally C. ADRIAN & C. PRESS, GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA (5th ed. 1977);
J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, THE METROPOLIS: ITS PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC
LIFE (3d ed. 1975); D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT: CASES, TEXT
& PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1971); F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT
IN URBAN AREAS (1970).
78. See, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE
CONTROL (1972); W. REILLY, THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZENS' GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH
(1973).
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portunities. Environmentalists seek to redress the balance be-
tween nature and man. Housing advocates, on the other hand,
argue that "people have got to come first." Protectors of the envi-
ronment stress the need to conserve land, while housing activists
insist that "we are filthy rich with land in America's metropolitan
areas." Even when exclusionary motives are absent, environ-
mentally inspired land-use controls limit the land available for
devleopment, thus increasing its cost and reducing its use for
lower-cost housing.79
Local governments decide housing and related land use policy ques-
tions. In the strictly traditional legal sense, state governments are responsi-
ble for safeguarding the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the public
under the tenth amendment of the United States Constitution. But, in
practice, through state enabling acts most state legislatures have delegated
virtually the entire responsibility for housing and land use planning to lo-
cal governmental units."0 Local zoning boards have in turn been estab-
lished in most cities of any size to implement these planning powers.
Proposing maps and ordinances, these local planning agencies oversee
land usage-the commercial, industrial, and residential nature of buildings
in particular areas, their height and density, subdivision development, the
provision for parks and open space, and related matters. Such planning
efforts are necessary and are frequently said to be "comprehensive" in na-
ture-to promote a broad, rational policymaking approach to urban and
suburban problems. They are designed for both physical and aesthetic pur-
poses with the goal of establishing a desirable overall scheme for the urban
and suburban environment.
But in this process political considerations inevitably appear, including
the issue of exclusionary zoning to keep minorities and the poor out of
white suburbs. If politics involves the "authoritative allocation of values
for society"" t then the planning process is in no small measure political in
character. In this process the interests of numerous individuals and groups
are plainly affected when planning actions are adopted and implemented.
"Significant planning problems are never simply technical; they always in-
volve the determination of priorities among values."8 2 Further, these val-
ues are deeply held, and planning constitutes a political issue not only
because values are authoritatively allocated, but because land use is intri-
79. M. DANIELSON, supra note 26, at 127. But see M. BROOKS, HOUSING EQUITY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE NEEDLESS CONFLICT (1976).
80. See generaly the sources cited in note 78 supra.
81. D. EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE 129 (1953).
82. A. ALTSHULER, THE CITY PLANNING PROCESS: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS 4-5 (1965).
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cately related to other major issues (minority housing, energy conserva-
tion, transportation, etc.) and because it profoundly affects so many
fundamental aspects of everyday life (the location of where people live and
work, their sewage and water facilities, transportation systems, recreation
alternatives, and many economic considerations involved in such ques-
tions).
Take the case of the suburbs, where the issue of additional development
outside a metropolitan area is usually of great concern to citizen's groups,
real estate and business interests, and governmental officials.83 Citizen as-
sociations are often most anxious to stop undesirable land usage within
their specific communities. "Undesirable" uses may include rezoning
which would permit new commercial activity, industry, or low-income
housing, thus bringing in minorities and newcomers of lower socio-
economic status. Some developers, by contrast, are strongly prone to sup-
port continued commercial growth and higher population densities be-
cause they earn their keep through such new development. Developers
may therefore find themselves in- conflict with organized citizens of an
area, but in agreement with minorities and the economically disadvan-
taged who back low-cost, high density housing. In these instances, tradi-
tional "liberal" and "conservative" labels are often inapplicable, for as
mentioned above, environmentalists may oppose actions which would help
upgrade the lives of poorer minority citizens, while developers may typi-
cally favor such actions. "Clearly, less expensive housing would be built if
builders were not confronted by local restrictions which reduce the supply
of land available for housing, increase its costs, and prevent the most eco-
nomical construction methods and materials from being used." 4
Between these opposing camps are elected officials and professional
planners, each well aware of the positions of these groups. As might be
expected, each group finds that certain officials are more sympathetic with
their positions than others-a fact that may give rise to intergovernmental
friction. In suburban planning commissions, for instance, planners often
have liberal values, as contrasted to the more conservative viewpoints of
commissioners themselves. This "may lead to an undercurrent of conflict
and distrust between the lay and professional portions of the planning bu-
reaucracy." 5 A chief reason for this conflict and distrust is that political
officials typically furnish little guidance for planners in the early stages of
their work when strategic choices among opposing values must be
83. The following discussion is based in large part on H. LEBLANC & D. ALLENS-
WORTH, THE POLITICS OF STATES AND URBAN COMMUNITIES 281-83 (1971).
84. M. DANIELSON, supra note 26, at 76.
85. H. LEBLANC & D. ALLENSWORTH, supra note 83, at 282.
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weighed. Only later, when value clashes become plainly evident, does
political conflict often surface, and then, to no one's surprise, it is discov-
ered that new suburbs have neglected to plan any housing to speak of for
the poor and minorities. In a nutshell, this is the essence of the process
involved in land use, zoning, and growth controls. But, again, the rub
comes when this process is employed to exclude "undesirables" who, like
everyone else, have a right to live wherever they care to and can.
What has the federal judiciary, and specifically the Supreme Court,
done to affect this process? In the landmark case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co. ,86 the Supreme Court sanctioned the constitutionality of municipal
zoning. The Court, demonstrating a strong deference to local control, held
that the zoning power was a rational means to promote the safety, health,
morals, and general welfare of the public. Yet aside from these laudatory
purposes, municipal zoning soon was seized upon by local governments for
discriminatory purposes. Communities wanting to exclude "un-
desirables"--of course a euphemism for racial minorities and indigents-
often utilized the zoning power to effectuate their goals. Long ago the
Supreme Court struck down local zoning enactments that explicitly barred
racial minorities, 7 but exclusionary zoning and the use of the zoning
86. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Commenting on the Euclid decision, Haar & Iatridis have
appropriately emphasized that:
[tihe potential for racial segregation to become a motive for legislative action was
recognized (and put aside for consideration at some future, indeterminate time if
the case could be established) by the first Supreme Court decision on the subject,
which upheld the validity of comprehensive zoning in 1926. Fodder for sharp de-
bate on both moral and constitutional grounds ever since that date, the exclusion-
ary aspects of land-use controls have recently come to be recognized as a major
roadblock to the implementation of national housing policies.
C. HAAR & D. IATRIDIS, supra note 36, at 15.
87. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917). Buchanan ruled that local zoning ordinances expressly forbidding housing opportu-
nities for blacks in "Caucasian" neighborhoods were unconstitutional, although some
Southern cities continued to enforce such laws. See L. MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE
STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO 250-51 (1966).
Rather than being a zoning case per se, Shelley prohibited state enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants. However, Vose, the foremost expert on restrictive covenants, has in-
terestingly noted that "[t]he end of equitable enforcement of racial covenants in 1948
changed few attitudes about the desirability of having Negro neighbors. Some home owners
confessed to racial prejudice, pure and simple. A larger number claimed to abhor discrimi-
nation, but defended residential segregation with economic arguments." C. VOSE, supra
note 51, at 218. Moreover:
Without legal support but with the compulsion to segregate remaining, white
property owners in all parts of the country received the cooperation of real-estate
boards in keeping Negroes from buying homes in residential areas traditionally
reserved for whites. In the past, realtors ordinarily respected the force of restrictive
covenants. The Supreme Court's decision in the 1948 case did not change the
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power to raise the cost of decent housing beyond the economic means of
low and moderate-income persons soon supplanted earlier and more bla-
tant racial discriminatory practices.88
Given the fact that a disproportionately large percentage of low and
moderate-income persons are also members of minority groups, exclusion-
ary zoning ordinances have directly promoted housing segregation, polari-
zation, and isolation. With this in mind, one might expect that the
Supreme Court would be prepared to overturn zoning practices that inten-
tionally price these persons out of the marketplace. However, the Court
generally refrained from deciding exclusionary zoning cases until the
1970s,8 9 and the Burger Court has refused to declare various exclusionary
practices illegal.9° The Burger Court continues to apply the deferential
standards of Euclid to exclusionary zoning actions that impinge on the le-
gitimate though legally unrecognized rights of nonresident minorities. As
a consequence, these people are forced to reside in inferior neighborhoods
where their economic hardships are exacerbated. 1 In short, although the
federal courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, have long stood as the
bastion of hope for powerless minorities, the exclusionary zoning decisions
of the Burger Court have reversed this time-honored role by precluding
anything but the most perfunctory role for them in exclusionary land use
disputes.
minds of most real-estate salesmen. That decision made their position of greater
importance for they could enforce segregation whereas the Court would not.
Within a month the power of real-estate organizations was being felt.
Id at 223. See also text accompanying notes 201-04 infra.
88. The most commonly utilized types of exclusionary zoning ordinances have been
those mandating minimum lot size and floor space requirements, and those prohibiting con-
struction of multiple-family dwellings. See Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1645, 1645-46 (1971).
89. See Note, Exclusionary Zoning anda Reluctant Supreme Court, 13 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 107 n.3 (1977).
90. See Lamb & Lustig, supra note 1 (discussing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)). See also Sager, supra
note 1. It should be mentioned that the Supreme Court has never declared that housing is a
fundamental right, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972), but it has noted that
"[h]ousing is a necessity of life." Black v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921).
91. See, e.g., Bums, Class Struggle in the Suburbs." Exclusionary Zoning Against the
Poor, 2 HASTINGS. CONST. L.Q. 179, 179-81 (1975); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary
Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 781 (1969); Note, supra
note 88; Note, Zoning-Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.: An
Implicit Endorsement of Exclusionary Zoning? 55 N.C.L. REV. 733, 744-45 (1977); Note, The
Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE
L.J. 61 (1971). See also text accompanying notes 103-30 infra.
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The Burger Court has also shown little interest in the fact that exclusion
has a major impact on equal educational opportunity. Since education is
one of the necessary attributes for success in later life in most cases,92 fail-
ure to receive an adequate education is often tantamount to permanent
confinement to life in run-down neighborhoods. But the disparities in edu-
cational spending between central city school districts and suburban
school districts are astronomical. A comparison of expenditures per pupil
and pupil/teacher ratios between central city and suburban schools reveals
that expenditures per pupil in the suburbs are approximately 35 percent
greater and that pupil/teacher ratios are about 35 percent lower. 93 More-
over, the physical isolation of the poor from wealthier pupils and schools
hinders academic achievement. The classic study of the effects of socio-
economic status on educational quality, the so-called Coleman Report,94
indicates that a student's academic performance is highly dependent on the
background of the other pupils in his or her school. Thus, if a pupil of low
socio-economic status is taken from a school of similar pupils and placed
in a suburban school with students of higher socio-economic status, his or
her academic performance is likely to increase significantly. 95 Yet, while
the guarantee of desegregated education has been the express policy of the
American legal system ever since Brown v. Board of Education,96 unless
this nation can thwart exclusionary practices so that low and moderate-
income housing is located in suburban areas with substantial white popu-
lations, the commendable goal of equal educational opportunity will not
be accomplished. Interdistrict busing, the only other major alternative
92. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954):
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for edu-
cation both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public re-
sponsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to ad-
just normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life f he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms. (emphasis added).
These insightful words of Chief Justice Earl Warren, written twenty-seven years ago, have
lost none of their vitality today. But cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez,
411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973) (education not a fundamental right explicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution).
93. Note, Zoning-Arlington Heights, supra note 91, at 744 n.69.
94. Note, supra note 88, at 1664 (citing U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, EQUALITY OF ED-
UCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 21-22 (1966)).
95. Id
96. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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means to provide for desegregated educational opportunities, is not only a
-burdensome and costly remedy, but its use was limited by the Burger
Court in Milliken v. Bradley. 7
Finally, exclusionary zoning clearly stands in direct opposition to the
long recognized national commitment to provide a decent home and a
suitable living environment for all persons. The Housing Act of 1937,98
which established a federal housing agency authorized to make loans and
grants to state agencies for slum clearance and low-rent housing projects,
and the Housing Act of 1949, 99 which created the first major federal urban
renewal program, laid the foundation for this commitment. A more recent
housing enactment by Congress, the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974, I°" authorizes the allocation of federal grants for the pri-
mary purpose of "the development of viable urban communities, by
providing decent housing and a suitable living environment and ex-
panding economic opportunities, principally for persons of low and mod-
erate income."'' But because of widespread exclusionary practices, such
congressional goals and commitments have not been and cannot be met.
As a result, most minorities still are forced to live in less than "decent"
housing facilities. The ineluctable conclusion that must therefore be drawn
is that the goals that Congress has set forth for this country have not been
achieved, because "to deny any group of persons access to reasonably
priced housing in the suburbs is to deny that group access to a higher qual-
ity education, to diminish its ability to compete for new jobs in expanding
industries, and to deny it amenities like fresh air, open space, and a lower
crime rate."'' 0 2
E Ghetto Living Conditions in a Segregated Society
The disadvantages that minorities suffer as a result of housing polariza-
tion and discrimination need some elaboration, although they should be at
least partially understood by all. To begin to comprehend these disadvan-
tages, we must recognize that the great migration of blacks from the South
to the North too often led to a ghetto existence for most blacks. Moving to
the cities, blacks typically found themselves forced into the older parts of
cities, central business districts, and later high-rise publicly-financed apart-
ment buildings which rapidly declined in quality. There were some excep-
97. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
98. 42 U.S.C. § § 1401-1430 (1976).
99. Id § § 1441-1490 (1976).
100. Id. § § 5301-5317 (1976).
101. Id. § 5301(c) (1976).
102. Note, Zoning--Arlington Heights, supra note 91, at 744-45.
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tions, of course, where blacks were scattered thinly throughout white
neighborhoods, frequently in servants' quarters in the first half of the
twentieth century, or in black housing pockets. The early development of
black ghettos, and exceptions to these living patterns, have best been de-
scribed in the following words:
The black ghettos of American cities are primarily a twentieth
century phenomenon. . . Recent scholarship indicates that the
roots of the twentieth century black ghettos are to be found in the
patterns of urban living that developed during the nineteenth
century. While much research remains to be done, it can be said
that although Negroes were widely distributed in various neigh-
borhoods within the cities, they were more concentrated in cer-
tain areas than in others, with many blacks living in small
enclaves along waterfronts or on the edges of towns ...
In cities like Philadelphia, alley dwellings created a distribu-
tion of the black population in small clusters intermixed with
clusters of better dwellings of whites. A special case of this was
the pattern of urban slaves in Southern cities like Charleston,
New Orleans, and Georgetown (an old part of Washington),
where the slaves inhabited quarters in back of the grand houses
of wealthy whites. The poorer, unskilled, laboring class of free
Negroes, on the other hand, tended to live in the least desirable
areas-sometimes in predominantly white working-class neigh-
borhoods and at other times in black enclaves which, except that
they were smaller, had all the characteristics of modern urban
slums. Over the decades, as cities grew and economic and social
conditions changed, the areas of greatest black concentration
often shifted, and the degree of residential segregation tended to
become more clearly defined ...
In the Northern cities of the twentieth century, the ghettos usu-
ally first developed in the decaying older residential areas, near
the central city. In the South this was also often true. Ghettoiza-
tion in the South was still most prevalent in the newer towns such
as Durham, Atlanta, or Birmingham, where the ghettos fre-
quently developed in Negro additions built on the edges of the
expanding cities. The older Southern municipalities were slower
to completely segregate their black populations. New black
neighborhoods appeared, but older mixed areas persisted as well.
In Charleston, an extreme case, the black population was scat-
tered throughout. the city as late as World War II.1°3
103. J. BRACEY, RISE OF THE GHETTO 1-3 (1971). It should be noted, however, that de-
spite the problems associated with ghetto living, there are some advantages which attach to
minority concentration in the cities. For example, in 1968 the National Commission on
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Of course, the growing discriminatory practices against blacks had a great
deal to do with the evolution of black ghettos and overt--often violent-
attempts to keep blacks in "their place" and out of white areas."
With many minorities living in city ghettos, problems abound.° 5 First
are the problems of overcrowding and disproportionately high housing
costs."16 And historically, the limited supply of housing has intensified
these problems. For example, the period of World War I was character-
ized by restrictions being placed on the building of new homes, making it
even more difficult for minorities to locate in decent and affordable facili-
ties."°7 "Under these circumstances, neither pressures of rapidly growing
Negro populations in many cities, nor improvement among Negroes in
levels of occupational status and income had much effect on patterns of
residential segregation."' 8 After the War there was a sharp growth in the
housing supply, with the suburbs expanding at a more rapid rate than ever
before for white households.0 9 With the white exodus from the cities,
more housing opportunities were available to minorities in formerly white
areas. "Substantial expansion in Negro residential areas occurred, in con-
trast to the crowding and congestion of the preceding decade."'"' Never-
theless, blacks are far less likely to own homes than whites. While a mere
thirty-eight percent of blacks owned their homes in 1960, sixty-four per-
cent of whites owned theirs."' And poverty does not completely explain
this discrepency.' 12
Beyond the questions of overcrowding and costs, minorities must con-
tend with deteriorating, substandard housing. A 1976 report on black
housing, issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
found that blacks as a whole were much more poorly housed than the total
Urban Problems predicted that "[tihe prospect is that the political base of many of our larger
cities, in the South, Northeast, and West, will be that of a black majority by 1985." NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 52 (1968). In-
deed, the prediction of the Commission is already coming true as an increasing number of
blacks are being elected as city officials throughout the country.
104. J. BRACEY, supra note 103, at 3.
105. See, e.g., M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES 63-81 (1962); D. HUNTER, THE SLUMS: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE ch. 2 (1968); R.
LINEBERRY & I. SHARKANSKY, URBAN POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 361-70 (3d ed. 1978).
106. S. BERGER, supra note 39; J. HECHT, supra note 34, at 17; F. WILSON, COST OF
HOUSING IN BLACK NEIGHBORHOODS 37-38 (1974).
107. K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, supra note 42, at 3.
108. Id.
109. Id
110. Id. at 3-4.
Ill. S. BERGER, supra note 39, at 23.
112. Id.
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population."l 3 The report indicated that black housing is flawed more
than twice as often as the housing of the total population; that the propor-
tion of blacks living in units with multiple flaws is more than three times
that of the total population; that blacks typically live in older housing
more so than the overall population does; and that black housing suffers
most frequently from deficiencies in maintenance and plumbing.ll 4 Addi-
tionally, the study reaffirmed the fact that blacks spend significantly more
of their total incomes for housing than does the remainder of the popula-
tion. Thirty-seven percent of blacks, but only twenty percent of the total
population, need to spend more than a quarter of their incomes to live in
decent, uncrowded housing. The situation is better, but not substantially
so, for Hispanics, 115 as well as other minority groups. 116 As a result of the
substandard, decaying condition of housing in which many minorities are
forced to live, family life is disrupted and emotional problems emerge.
"The economic and psychological burdens resulting from these housing
conditions have contributed notably to . . .broken homes, emotional in-
stability, and the ghetto brutalization of life." 117
One would be totally remiss to ignore another important problem of the
ghettos: crime, juvenile delinquency, and vandalism. Data reveal that
crime rates are greatest in slums.lS "The rates are generally highest near
the center of the city and decrease with distance from the center; they are
also high near industrial and commercial subcenters."' 9 These are of
course precisely the areas in which most minorities have been forced to
reside. In 1964 it was reported that "in slums comprising something like
113. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON Hous-
ING: BLACKS: How WELL ARE THEY HOUSED? (1976).
114. Id
115. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON Hous-
ING: HISPANICS: How WELL ARE THEY HOUSED? (1976).
116. J. HECHT, supra note 34, at 16.
117. M. DEUTSCH & M. COLLINS, INTERRACIAL HOUSING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUA-
TION OF A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 6 (1951). It should be noted, too, that ghettos are character-
ized by unsanitary living conditions and higher morbidity and mortality rates. D. WILNER,
HOUSING ENVIRONMENT AND FAMILY LIFE 243-46 (1962).
118. See generally A. DOWNS, supra note 26, at 73-76, 176-77; D. HUNTER, supra note
105, at 69-76; C. SHAW & H. MCKAY, DELINQUENCY AREAS (1929).
119. D. HUNTER, supra note 105, at 70. However, as Downs points out:
The high crime, vandalism, and delinquency rates in low-income areas are caused
to a great extent by the pervasive economic deprivation there .... Furthermore,
neighborhood institutions in crisis ghettos debilitate individual households by ex-
ploiting and encouraging their weaknesses while providing minimal support to
their strengths. Examples are retail stores that charge exorbitantly for credit
purchases, drug pushers, numbers racketeers, and street gangs.
A. DoWNs, supra note 26, at 74.
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20 per cent of the average American city's residential area occur 45 per
cent of the major crimes, 55 per cent of juvenile delinquency, and 50 per
cent of the arrests."' 2 ° Since that time ghettos have spread in most major
metropolitan areas, bringing along rising crime rates.' 2 ' As crime spreads,
those able to move further away from it have overwhelmingly done so.
Suburban growth therefore reflects to some degree the desire of economi-
cally and socially mobile citizens to flee high crime rates. They then seek to
take measures in their new environment to insure that police protection is
of the highest caliber and crime rates are low. "Many whites associate
high crime rates with blacks; so they are doubly fearful of having low and
moderate-income black households as neighbors." 122  Meanwhile,
stranded in the city, low-income minority families find themselves the
main targets of criminals. Still, it must be emphasized that "[tihough crime
rates are high [in these areas], only a minority of the residents actually
commit crimes or exhibit what most Americans would consider undesir-
able behavior." 123
A final problem faced by minorities, although this list is by no means
complete, is that housing segregation and polarization lead to major ineq-
uities in governmental services, with whites enjoying better public services
than minorities. 24 Given the ever growing flight of the white middle and
upper-class, cities are finding themselves with steadily diminishing tax ba-
ses to provide vital municipal services. The overall quality of housing, edu-
cation, fire and police protection, sanitation disposal, health and other
services is frequently deficient in the urban centers in comparison to that in
the suburbs. Inequities in public services for whites and minorities are
thus virtually inevitable under current conditions. For example, one care-
ful and comprehensive statistical analysis found that "the segregation of
public goods consumption through suburbanization has become a central
part of the structure of inequality among urban residents,"' 25 and that
"6municipal government becomes an institutional arrangement for promot-
ing and protecting the unequal distribution of scarce resources."' 26 Gov-
ernment therefore may perpetuate the inequities that exist among different
120. D. HUNTER, supra note 105, at 70-7 1.
121. Id at 73-76.
122. A. DowNs, supra note 26, at 73.
123. Id. at 74.
124. See, e.g., Dye, Inequality and Civil-Rights Policy in the States, 31 J. POL. 1080 (1969);
Hill, Separate and Unequal: Governmental Inequality in the Metropolis, 68 AM. POL. SC,.
REV. 1557 (1974); Schumaker & Getter, Responsiveness Bias in 51 American Communities, 21
AM. J. POL. Sci. 247 (1977).
125. Hill, supra note 124, at 1557.
126. Id at 1559.
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societal groups by providing better services to those who actually need
them the least. "The persistence of institutional racism reflects a struggle
among racially demarcated status groups over the distribution of commod-
ities, symbols of status, jobs and valued ways of living in the metropo-
lis,'" 2 7 and there has been "a deterioration of public services [for
minorities] in such crucial areas as education, health, housing, and police
and fire protection." 28 In sum, "[tihe political incorporation and munici-
pal segregation of classes and status groups in the metropolis tend to
divorce fiscal resources from public needs and serve to create and perpetu-
ate inequality [of public services] among urban residents in the United
States." 1
29
The most appropriate way to conclude this discussion, from an overview
perspective, is to repeat the basic conclusion of the 1968 National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders. What the above facts indicate is that we
are still inexorably heading in the direction of two largely separate but
unequal societies. One is mainly black and impoverished, located in the
central cities; the other, predominantly white and comparatively affluent, is
located in the suburbs and in outlying areas.' 3 ° This is a particularly omi-
nous development, for the present pattern of racial segregation is a poten-
tially explosive feature of American society. The rigid segregation and
polarization of racial and economic groups intensifies the potential for in-
terracial violence. Unless we want a repeat of the urban riots of the 1960s,
low-income minorities must be allowed to share equally in the overall soci-
etal distribution of "the good life."
F The Vicious Circle
Segregated housing contributes mightily to a vicious circle that also in-
cludes educational and employment discrimination. The concept is sim-
ple, but it has received relatively little attention when compared to the
above dimensions of discrimination and segregation. Because of poor
schooling for many minorities, they cannot find well-paying jobs. Without
such jobs they often cannot afford to live in nicer neighborhoods with de-
cent housing. And because of their location in less desirable communities,
good educational systems are less likely to be available. Thus we face
what former Senator Birch Bayh called "[a] sordid endless chain of ine-
quality."'' "That interlocking system of education, employment, and
127. Id
128. Id at 1560. See also id at 1564-65; Farley & Taeuber, supra note 58, at 953-56.
129. Hill, supra note 124, at 1567.
130. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 25-26 (1968).
131. Hearings, supra note 64, at 106.
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housing," noted Bayh, "has been used to enslave a people by keeping them
undereducated, jobless, and poor, as well as separately and substandardly
housed." 132
Few scholars have addressed this question. Of those who have, some
stress that the circle of discrimination is broader than the housing-employ-
ment-education trilogy. For example, Sorenson, Taeuber, and Hollings-
worth write that "[r]esidential segregation of Negroes and other ethnic
minorities [has] been shown to be both cause and consequence in the intri-
cate web of relationships among poverty, racial discrimination, education,
access to government services and benefits, and life chances of chil-
dren." 1 33 Taeuber and Taeuber note further that residential segregation
not only inhibits the development of informal, neighborly rela-
tions between whites and Negroes, but ensures the segregation of
a variety of public and private facilities. The clientele of schools,
hospitals, libraries, parks, and stores is determined in large part
by the racial composition of the neighborhood in which they are
located. ' 34
A similar theme and its myriad implications have been elaborated upon by
Deutsch and Collins:
[R]esidential segregation brings with it, as a natural consequence,
segregation in many other areas of living. If Negro and white
people do not live near each other,. . . they cannot-even if they
otherwise would-associate with each other in the many activi-
ties founded on common neighborhood. Segregated racial neigh-
borhoods tended to bring with them segregated schools,
recreational centers, shopping districts, playgrounds, theaters,
hospitals, leisure-time facilities, etc. Thus, one result of residen-
tial segregation is that prejudiced whites have little opportunity
to see Negroes in social contexts which bring out the funda-
mental condition humaine of Negroes and whites. They do not
see the Negroes, for example, as school children disliking home-
work, as expectant mothers in their first pregnancy, as tenants
complaining about their landlords, or as breadwinners facing a
contracting labor market. Moreover, the latent hostility in the
segregated, exaggerated by the guilt feelings of the segregators, is
likely to result in behavior which will provide a further rationale
for prejudice and segregation. Residential segregation has a dy-
namic which tends to be self-perpetuating and reinforcing of
132. id at 2.
133. A. SORENSEN, K. TAEUBER & L. HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 45, at 1.
134. K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, supra note 42, at 1.
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prejudice. 135
Various psychological implictions of segregated housing, as part of the
vicious circle, have also been explored by Hecht. He observes:
[Tjhe Negro is profoundly affected as a person by the low self-
image [that housing] discrimination creates. John Howard Grif-
fin, a white writer who posed as a Negro by undergoing a series
of medical treatments which temporarily changed the color of his
skin to black, wrote in Black Like Me, "The Negro sees and re-
acts differently not because he is a Negro, but because he is sup-
pressed. .. ."
Discrimination in housing also prevents what otherwise would
be an effective way of breaking down traditional prejudices.
Well-known psychologists such as Gordon Allport, Kenneth
Clark, Morton Deutsch, and Thomas Pettigrew have shown that
while prejudices are caused in many ways, more favorable atti-
tudes between whites and blacks usually result when there is
equal-status interracial contact in a noncompetitive situation.
Another important factor is the relation between attitudes and
behavior. Behavior is not the result of attitudes. Rather the two
are closely interrelated, and attitudes often are altered as a result
of behavior. The phenomenon has been termed "cognitive disso-
nance." In simple terms, if someone behaves contrary to his atti-
tudes, he tends to adjust his attitudes in the direction of his
behavior. Thus a person may be moderately positive about a
proposed purchase, such as a house or a car, but once the con-
tract is signed his moderate attitude becomes stronger. Obviously
the effect of cognitive dissonance will be to decrease unfavorable
prejudices in interracial housing situations in order that the atti-
tude be more consistent with the pattern of behavior. Con-
versely, when people discriminate they will need to increase their
prejudicial attitudes to justify their behavior.'36
This entire subject of the circle of discrimination naturally leads to the
all-important question of how to break and destroy it. There is, alas, no
easy answer. I would contend, however, that it would be most effective to
break the circle through aggressive implementation by the federal govern-
ment of fair housing laws and court decisions-although this is not the
most politically popular or possible route. My basic argument, preliminary
and elementary though it is, would be that by providing greater opportuni-
ties for housing in white urban and suburban areas through active federal
135. M. DEUTSCH & M. COLLINS, supra note 117, at 5-6, (quoting G. MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944)).
136. J. HECHT, supra note 34, at 17-19. On the nature of prejudice and how it can be
altered through interracial contact, see S. BERGER, supra note 39, at 29.
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civil rights enforcement, minorities would undoubtedly have greater access
to the rapid growth of employment opportunities outside the central city,
and minority children would not have to be bused, thereby avoiding that
explosive issue. In addition, as others have suggested,' 37 housing desegre-
gation helps to break down at least some traditional white feelings of
prejudice toward minorities. Intermingling in the same neighborhood will
tend to undermine the ingrained stereotypes of many whites, although ad-
mittedly some attitudes will remain little affected. The commonalities of
all persons, regardless of race, will become more obvious to many whites
who have never regularly associated with minorities. While many lower-
class whites may feel economically and psychologically threatened by
housing desegregation, this will be less true of most middle- and upper-
class whites.' 38 If more favorable racial attitudes can be nurtured in the
latter groups through desegregation, surely such an experiment is worth
the effort.
Yet, in the final analysis, there is little agreement among civil rights ad-
vocates or academics on the "best way" to break the chain, and strong
cases can be advanced for attacking educational and employment discrimi-
nation before the more complex and emotional method involving housing.
Or, some may assert, the real panacea may more likely be a simultaneous
three-pronged attack on all forms of housing, employment, and educa-
tional discrimination. As enticing as this idea sounds at first blush, it is
even more idealistic than my proposal. Such a three-way attack would
probably require administrative coordination between myriad federal civil
rights enforcement agencies to the degree that we have never even ap-
proached in the past.'39 Coordination in fact involves a "conservative
strategy, and, as such, is often an alternative to the development of more
far-reaching social and institutional reforms," "4 and past efforts to coordi-
nate civil rights implementation among only a few agencies have largely
been failures.' 4 ' If dreams could be transformed into realities, a three-
pronged attack would most likely be successful through the merger of all
federal civil rights programs into a Cabinet-level Department of Equal
Opportunity. But I have explained elsewhere the disadvantages that
137. See text accompanying notes 135-36 supra.
138. S. BERGER, supra note 39, at 26.
139. Lamb, Administrative Coordination in Civil Rights Enforcement, supra note 1, at 857-
59.
140. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IMPROVING FED-
ERAL GRANTS MANAGEMENT 81 (1977).
141. Lamb, Presidential Leadershp, Governmental Reorganization, and Equal Employment
Opportunity, supra note 1, at 85-86.
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would inevitably be associated with such a scheme.142 If there is a solution
to breaking the circle of discrimination, then, it may still lie just as much in
aggressive and unequivocal fair housing enforcement as in any other ap-
proach.
G. The Federal Government's Role in Housing Segregation
Federal policies have been a principal cause of the extensive growth of
American suburbs, yet those policies have done little to promote equal
housing opportunities for minorities and the poor in these areas. 143 Before
World War II, "[w]hen the collapse of the private housing market brought
the government massively into the housing business in the New Deal pe-
riod, the new federal agencies adopted and reinforced the racial practices
of the real estate and mortgage lending industries."'" The role of the fed-
eral government in housing then grew substantially between the 1940s and
1970s, but equal opportunity remained a low priority. Thus, in 1975 the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights boldly asserted that "[b]ecause of the
extensive nature of its involvement in housing and community develop-
ment, the Federal Government. . .has also been most influential in creat-
ing and maintaining urban residential segregation." 45
Specifically, six of the most significant federal policies that have had a
discriminatory effect-if not initially a discriminatory intent-involve
home mortgage insurance, highway development subsidies, the location of
federal facilities, the location of public housing, urban renewal, and fed-
eral income tax deductions that make it easier for suburbanites to flee to
segregated areas. Federal mortgage guarantees have allowed millions of
families to purchase homes.146 The creation of the mortgage programs of
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was particularly crucial.
"FHA mortgage insurance revolutionized home financing by guaranteeing
payment on mortgages which met the agency's standards of housing quali-
ty and appraised market value. With the risk eliminated, lenders were
142. Id at 89-90.
143. See, e.g., D. FALK & H. FRANKLIN, supra note 58, at 93-96; Orfield, supra note 30,
at 785-90.
144. Orfield, supra note 30, at 785.
145. TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY, supra note 57, at
39. See also EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 37, at 36. The federal govern-
ment has "furthered the extent to which metropolitan growth has led to racial separation.
The Federal role has ranged from direct action which assured neighborhood segregation,
through action for other purposes which produced segregation as a side effect, to a policy of
inaction when actual discrimination occurred." Id
146. M. DANIELSON, supra note 26, at 203; BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note
103, at 100.
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willing to accept lower interest rates and much longer periods of repay-
ment."' 47 The vast majority of FHA-supported homes were, as a result of
underwriting requirements, located in the suburbs and used to house
whites. Indeed, for years the practices of the federal government, and es-
pecially the FHA, directly contributed to housing segregation. 48 The pol-
icies of the Veterans Administration (VA), which assists veterans with low-
interest loans for purchasing homes, had a similar effect. 149 And subse-
quent changes in FHA and VA policies have had little impact on segrega-
tion which had already set in very firmly.' 5 ° Thus, one might expect that
less than 1.5 million low-income units were built with public monies be-
tween 1934 and 1970,' and that only two percent of FHA insured loans
were made to blacks from the mid-1940s through the end of the fifties.' 52
Likewise, President Johnson's rent supplement program primarily assisted
blacks in the inner cities; less than ten percent of those funds were devoted
to rent supplements for minorities and the poor in suburbia.'5 3
Virtually all white suburbs similarly could not have developed without
federally subsidized highways. "Suburbanization was greatly facilitated
by massive federal highway investments which opened vast areas along the
metropolitan periphery for development."-'" Congress authorized over
$5.4 billion in 1971 alone, for example, for highway subsidies.1 55 New
highway systems made it easier for persons working in the city to escape to
surrounding areas to live, with the accompanying loss of tax revenues for
the cities. Relatively little attention was paid by the Department of Trans-
portation during the 1960s to whether these highway developments would
promote residential segregation via the growth of suburbs, the impact that
new highways would have on minority neighborhoods that they were built
through, or whether the highways were designed and located-overtly or
covertly-to separate white and minority areas within the cities.' 5 6 Thus,
147. Orfield, supra note 30, at 785.
148. TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING, supra note 57,
at 39-40. See also Orfield, supra note 30, at 786; text accompanying notes 217-18 infra.
149. TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING, supra note 57,
at 40. See also Orfield, supra note 30, at 788-89; text accompanying notes 219-26 infra.
150. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 37, at 38; U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, HOME OWNERSHIP FOR LOWER INCOME FAMILIES 87 (1971).
151. M. DANIELSON, supra note 26, at 203.
152. TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING, supra note 57,
at 41; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING 5 (1973).
153. M. DANIELSON, supra note 26, at 208.
154. Id at 201.
155. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 37, at 44.
156. Id at 44-46. Department of Transportation officials did not think it was their re-
sponsibility "to withhold Federal funds in cases where the benefits of highway programs
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"[u]rban freeways have cut through ghettos to facilitate white surbanites'
travel from suburban homes to central city jobs. And the new roads also
have uprooted suburban minority communities, forcing minority subur-
banites to relocate in the central city." 157
Beyond all of this, federal agencies have often been guilty of relocating
government employment opportunities in the suburbs and away from the
areas in which minorities reside. "In its role as the nation's largest em-
ployer, the federal government . . . fueled the exodus to the suburbs." '158
Between 1963 and 1968 alone, over 17,000 federal jobs were moved from
predominantly black Washington to the predominantly white suburbs of
Maryland and Virginia, but virtually no pressure was placed on Washing-
ton's suburbs to change their housing and zoning practices to be more
open to minorities.' 59 The lack of moderately priced housing in the sub-
urbs, combined at times with various other practices that tend to control
growth, has therefore meant that inner-city residents could not move to
new job locations. These types of policies have directly contributed to in-
creasing housing segregation-and not only in the Washington metropoli-
would not be available on a nondiscriminatory basis, or where highway programs would
contribute to forced concentration of minorities." Id at 46.
157. Id at 45.
158. M. DANIELSON, supra note 26, at 202.
159. Id The location of new businesses and industries in the suburbs is a related cause
of continued housing segregation. See, e.g., EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note
37, at 24-27; Note, Suburban Relocation of Urban Employers, 62 IOWA L. REV. 427 (1976).
Since the 1950s, new businesses and industries increasingly have been placed in the sub-
urbs. In this context one commentator has calculated that from 1952 through 1972 over 80%
of newly created jobs were located in suburban areas. Note, Zoning-Arlington Heights,
supra note 91, at 745. While the suburbs, heavily dependent on local property taxes for
financing their services to the public, have readily accepted these businesses and industries,
"[tihe welcome mat ... has not been rolled out for the firms' workers. These communities
have been distinctly reluctant to modify their zoning requirements to permit housing for
industry's labor force." Bums, supra note 91, at 180. As unemployment in the central cities
increases, welfare rolls multiply, causing critical drains on already depleted city resources.
One does not have to stretch his or her imagination too far to visualize the numerous ways in
which economic segregation gnaws away at tax dollars. Common sense would seem to dic-
tate that, when all things are considered, it would be more economically feasible to desegre-
gate our communities than to maintain the destitute in separate enclaves. Id But without
reliance on such common sense, the consequences are all too obvious. Most importantly, the
suburban movement of business and industry has created an unemployment rate in the cen-
tral cities that is twice that of the national average. Id Thus, as one city planner has em-
phasized, "It]he decentralization of these firms has a marked effect on employment
opportunities in the city and when that effect is combined with the absence of housing op-
portunities in the areas to which those plants relocate, then there is a very substantial and
very far-reaching effect on black residents." EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note
37, at 44-45. See also Hill, supra note 124, at 1560. The future therefore seems clear: the
central cities will not receive new jobs and construction if trends since the 1950s continue.
See A. DowNs, supra note 26, at 19-20.
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tan area. 160 A chief reason is that, since minorities cannot find affordable
accommodations in the suburbs, weak or nonexistent transportation sys-
tems make commuting to work difficult, time-consuming, costly, or even
impossible. A 1968 study of five major metropolitan areas found that in
those cities having transit systems capable of transporting inner-city resi-
dents to suburban job locations, actual travel time could range from an
hour and a half to five hours a day and might entail three or four transfers!
The cost of transit fares ranged from $4 to $15 per week. These figures
indicate that a worker earning $150 for a 40-hour week, or $3.75 per hour,
could be effectively earning only $2.25 per hour when transit time and
expense are taken into account.' 61 Thus, because of transportation costs,
central city minorities may easily be excluded from the job markets where
they could otherwise find regular work at higher salaries.
With regard to site selection under the federal government's public
housing program, local public housing authorities (LHA's) were originally
allowed by the government to practice the "separate but equal" doctrine,
and they chose to do so in the overwhelming number of cases. "Under the
separate but equal policy, LHA's assessed the need for low-rent housing
separately for minorities and whites and provided housing according to
relative needs on a segregated basis."' 162 Moreover, only persons who
could pay some rent were selected for public housing. "Because a larger
proportion of poor minorities than of poor whites were at the lowest in-
come levels, with little or no resources available for rent, public housing
under the racial equity policy actually met the need of a smaller propor-
tion of the low-income minority population."' 163 This trend continued
through the decade of the fifties and into the sixties, despite laws and court
decisions suggesting that it was unconstitutional.' 64 Where there were
mixed occupancy practices, moreover, "mixed occupancy meant that a few
minority families lived in otherwise all-white projects or vice versa.' 65
What was worse, separate locations for white and minority public housing
were widespread, and two different sets of waiting lists were employed to
perpetuate segregation. "In some localities, the policies pursued by
160. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE MOVEMENT OF FEDERAL FACILITIES TO THE SUBURBS (1971).
161. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 103, at 48.
162. TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING, supra note 57,
at 46.
163. Id
164. Id at 46-47; see, e.g., Heyward v. Public Hous. Administration, 238 F.2d 689 (5th
Cir. 1956); Detroit Hous. Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955).
165. TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING, supra note 57,
at 47.
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LHA's, with the [Federal] Government's blessing, actually created segre-
gated residential patterns and concentrations of minority poor where they
had not existed before. In virtually all metropolitan areas, the location of
public housing accentuated the concentration of minority groups in central
cities."' 66 It was not until the late 1950s that the federal government's
public housing program began to combat these obvious discriminatory
practices actively, but these "efforts were frequently stymied by local oppo-
sition." 167
In addition, federal urban renewal programs of the 1950s and 1960s
completely upset the living patterns of many minority Americans, while
perpetuating segregation.' 68 As one observer has accurately noted, "urban
renewal was [frequently] devastating":
Financially strapped central cities often forgot the social goals
of the program in a futile rush to escape the vicious cycle of ur-
ban deterioration and escalating costs. To get the projects mov-
ing, local officials often certified that replacement housing was
available for poor blacks when there was none. Federal officials
who knew they were lying accepted their assurance and provided
funds.
The definition of successful renewal became efficient removal
of blacks from an area and their speedy replacement by higher-
income whites or businesses. Local officials chased after the chi-
mera of a restored tax base while pushing black families from
terrible housing conditions in old deteriorated areas to terrible
housing units, which cost more, in nearby deteriorated areas. "It
was all legal and proper," Charles Abrams wrote. "Wrecking a
Negro's building no longer had to be done by a mob. Here was a
way to do it constitutionally."
Federal housing and renewal policies respected the fragmenta-
tion of local power in metropolitan areas. Very few suburban
communities built public housing and some even used the urban
renewal program to wipe out small pockets of long-time poor
black residents. Most of all, however, the FHA and the Veterans
Administration (VA) mortgage insurance programs shaped and
reinforced the racial and economic segregation of suburbia.
FHA appraisers required assurances that insured properties
"shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial
group." The agency even drafted a model restrictive covenant
166. Id
167. Id at 48.
168. Many of the problems associated with urban renewal are detailed in J. WILSON,
URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND CONTROVERSY (1966).
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and urged its adoption. Private developers who wanted to sell
without discrimination met unending bureaucratic delays.
169
Finally, federal income tax policies have promoted housing segregation,
for obviously "[d]eductions for federal income tax purposes of locally as-
sessed real estate taxes and mortgage interest significantly eased the
financial burdens of suburban homeowners."' 70 Rubinowitz has concisely
summarized the above factors, and others, which clearly show the role that
the federal government has played in promoting segregation:
It is no accident that most middle- and upper-income people
live in the suburbs and most of the metropolitan poor live in cen-
tral cities. Public policies and subsidies made it possible. The
steady stream of the relatively affluent from the central cities in
the past several decades has not been merely the coincidental re-
sult of massive numbers of private market decisions. Public
funds built the roads which facilitated the trek to the suburbs,
since commuting to central city jobs was often necessary. FHA
mortgage insurance helped to finance the housing in the suburbs.
Tax breaks, subsidies for public services and numerous other
public benefits were bestowed on the suburbs, enticing the middle
class out of the central city.171
In recent years federal policies have contributed less-at least in a direct
sense-to residential segregation. Nevertheless, enforcement of the fair
housing laws has been weak, and continual efforts are being made to main-
tain the status quo.' 72 Although private discrimination is illegal under Ti-
tle VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,' and the Supreme Court's
decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. " real estate companies and
lending institutions perpetuate the dual housing market for whites and mi-
norities.'75 "[Flinance companies, banks, and governments usually are ex-
tremely unwilling to make more money available to arrest deterioration,
and, given the ghetto environment, people forced into the ghetto have little
reason to identify with their neighborhood and to want to invest the effort
169. Orfield, supra note 30, at 788, (quoting C. ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 112,
242-46 (1955)).
170. D. FALK & H. FRANKLIN, supra note 58, at 94.
171. L. RuBINOWITZ, supra note 23, at 94.
172. With respect to weak enforcement, see Lamb, Presidential Fair Housing Policies,
supra note i, at 620; 2 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE ... FOR FAIR HOUSING (1974).
173. 42 U.S.C. § § 3601-3631 (1976).
174. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
175. D. FALK & H. FRANKLIN, supra note 58, at 59.
[Vol. 30:363
Housing Discrimination and Segregation
necessary to try to maintain it."' 7 6 Generally speaking, the federal govern-
ment has been lax about curbing such real estate and lending practices,
and has not adequately stimulated reinvestment in decaying parts of the
cities.
H Persistent Segregation and the Needfor More
Aggressive Legal Action
It follows from the preceding discussion that there are a number of tra-
ditions and practices that the federal government should take legal action
against, particularly through more forceful administrative regulations and
implementation, to fight segregation and discrimination in housing. One
extremely important practice mentioned earlier is steering, especially when
it involves showing housing to minorities only in minority, racially chang-
ing, or deteriorating neighborhoods. It deserves repeating that white home-
owners and particularly persons in the business of real estate and lending
still believe that housing desegregation leads inevitably to minority slum
neighborhoods and declining property values.' Steering therefore re-
mains the most obvious and blatant form of housing discrimination, 78
and the one for which legal action is most necessary now.
Blockbusting is another practice which, although illegal, 79 still occa-
sionally occurs. When a minority family is able to penetrate the invisible
wall of housing segregation, realtors may use blockbusting to make large
profits and to turn the community into one which is soon mostly minority.
Blockbusting typically occurs in lower- and middle-class white areas where
minorities can afford to purchase homes. The real estate agent sells a house
to a minority family and then passes the word around the neighborhood
that a minority family is moving in. Soon thereafter realtors encourage
other whites to sell before their property values precipitously decline. The
dimensions of blockbusting and its impact have been vividly described:
Although most realtors have been staunch protectors of the
status quo, a few have made fortunes by blockbusting. . . . This
scheme involves the rapid transformation of a residential neigh-
borhood from all white to virtually all black. At its worst it is
carried out in somewhat the following manner. A house will go
on the market in a block of white-occupied, inexpensive, single-
family residences. A realtor will sell the home to a black family,
176. S. BERGER, supra note 39, at 24. The Taeubers reached the same basic conclusion.
See K. TAEUBER & A. TAEUBER, supra note 42, at 2-3.
177. See note 38 & accompanying text supra.
178. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1976).
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then place a "Sold" sign in the front yard and circulate the rumor
that the purchaser is black. In the next phase, nearby whites are
bombarded with telephone calls, letters, and door-to-door solici-
tations by real estate agents encouraging them to sell before the
area goes all black. Blockbusters play on the whites' fears of ra-
cial isolation, economic loss, and physical harm. The landowner
is warned that if he does not move now his may soon be the only
white family in an area which will become increasingly unsafe.
And since the influx of blacks will cause property values to de-
cline, the realtor cautions, the owner had better sell immediately.
As evidence that the neighborhood is deteriorating rapidly, some
blockbusters have been known to hire blacks to roar through the
area in noisy cars and to have black women with numerous chil-
dren walk the sidewalks. Except when neighborhood organiza-
tions geared to maintaining the area on an integrated basis spring
to life, the blockbuster has usually had his way.'
80
These blockbusting techniques, needless to say, contribute to the perpet-
uation of housing segregation, but the legal system has been too slow to
combat them vigorously. The small number of minority agents in major
real estate associations is another related problem where a solution could
have the effect of reducing the incidence of blockbusting. As illustrations,
the St. Louis Metropolitan Real Estate Board contained only about a
dozen black agents in 1970 out of a total membership of some 4,400, while
the Real Estate Board in Baltimore consisted of no black members until
1960, and only fifteen out of approximately 650 in 1970."s1 Certainly if
there were more black real estate agents in the white real estate establish-
ment, one might suspect that blockbusting would become more rare if for
no other reason than that black agents might be offended by the process
and raise private or even public controversy over its utilization.
Other practices such as redlining unjustifiably extend the effects of past
discrimination. 8 2 Redlining refers to the fact that banks and mortgage
180. H. ROGERS & C. BULLOCK, supra note 1, at 144. For other descriptions of
blockbusting and its legal implications, see, e.g., Glassberg, Legal Control of Blockbusting,
1972 URB. L. ANN. 145; Comment, The First Amendment 4 Blockbuster's Best Friend, 46
U.M.K.C.L. REV. 425 (1978); Comment, Blockbusting. Judicial and Legislative Response to
Real Estate Dealers' Excesses, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 818 (1973); Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEO.
L.J. 170 (1970).
181. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 37, at 16-19.
182. In at least two instances, federal courts have ruled that redlining is illegal under
Title VIII. See Harrison v. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 414 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ohio 1976);
Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976). Because of the
growing recognition of redlining in urban areas, the related legal literature has expanded
rapidly. See, e.g., Marshall, The Flight of the Thrfit Institutions.- One More Invitation to
Inner-City Disaster, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 113 (1974); Renne, Eliminating Redlining by Judi-
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companies have refused to make loans for housing in certain areas of cit-
ies, are reluctant to make loans without a guarantee of mortgage insur-
ance, require stricter lending terms for certain types of property, and reject
applications for'loans on houses over a certain age.' 8 3 These and other
traits of redlining were spelled out by the former Governor of Illinois, Dan
Walker, when he testified before the United States Senate in 1975. He
emphasized eleven ways in which redlining occurs:
1. Requiring down payments of a higher amount than are usu-
ally required for financing comparable properties in other areas;
2. Fixing loan interest rates in amounts higher than those set
for all or most other mortgages in other areas;
3. Fixing loan closing costs in amounts higher than those set
for all or most other mortgages in other areas;
4. Fixing loan maturities below the number of years to matur-
ity set for all or most other mortgages in other areas;
5. Refusing to lend on properties above a prescribed maxi-
mum number years of age;
6. Refusing to make loans in dollar amounts below a certain
minimum figure, thus excluding many of the lower-priced
properties often found in neighborhoods where redlining is prac-
ticed;
7. Refusing to lend on the basis of presumed "economic obso-
lescence" no matter what the conditions of an older property may
be;
8. Stalling on appraisals in amounts below what market value
actually should be, thus making home purchase transactions
more difficult to accomplish;
9. Setting appraisals to discourage potential borrowers;
10. Applying structural appraisal standards of a much more
rigid nature than those applied for comparable properties in
other areas;
11. Charging discount "points" as a way of discouraging
financing.' 84
Lenders tend to rationalize their redlining practices on grounds that they
have limited funds and that avoiding older or more racially changing
cialAction." Are Erasers Available? 29 VAND. L. REV. 987 (1976); Comment, The Legality of
Redlining Under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 463 (1976); Note, Attacking the
Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U.L. REV. 989 (1976). See also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, INSURANCE REDLINING: FACT NOT FICTION (1979).
183. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 37, at 23; Renne, supra note 182, at
990.
184. Hearings on S. 1281 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1975).
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neighborhoods is one of the best means of reducing bad loans. To be sure,
it is a responsibility of lenders to protect their depositors and shareholders.
However, since minority persons are most likely to reside in the redlined
areas, economic discrimination inevitably has the same effect as racial dis-
crimination, regardless of its intent.
Redlining therefore compounds the many severe problems that minori-
ties have experienced throughout the country's history. Homeowners in
redlined areas discover it to be extremely difficult to sell their homes. If
they rent their property, the character of the neighborhood is changed,
which discourages other potential homeowners from buying in the area.
Strict mortgage terms promote rates of default. Property increasingly be-
comes converted for commercial or industrial use. Thus, once redlining
becomes a regular practice, community decline rapidly accelerates. 185
Beyond the problems caused by steering, blockbusting, and redlining,
suburbs employ various means to discourage population growth and to
prohibit the construction of low-cost and multiple-dwelling housing that
would assist minorities.8 6 As noted earlier, the 1970s witnessed the emer-
gence of no-growth movements throughout America. 8 7 Voters in a
number of suburban communities have blocked sewage development and
additional construction to prevent further growth.188 Other practices have
an even greater exclusionary impact. Minimum requirements for lot size,
square footage, and quality of building materials easily make suburban
housing too expensive for minorities and other persons of lower income. 189
Where zoning codes are employed to keep these people out of suburbia,
the intent may be simply to discriminate, although the publicly stated rea-
son typically is to avoid the higher taxes and costs that such residents are
thought to bring.'9 ° In order to keep educational expenses low, for in-
stance, apartments may be limited to one bedroom, thereby excluding mi-
nority or low-income families of any size.' 9' Indeed, new apartment
buildings may be completely forbidden by local zoning codes. For in-
stance, "[i]n the New York metropolitan area, where exclusionary zoning
is particularly widespread, over 99 percent of all undeveloped land zoned
185. Renne, supra note 182, at 992-93.
186. See generally M. DANIELSON, supra note 26, chs. 2-4; Sloane, Changing Shape of
Land Use Litigation. Federal Court Challenges to Exclusionary Land Practices, 51 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 48 (1975).
187. See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
188. Id See M. DANIELSON, supra note 26, at 64-69.
189. See, e.g., Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, supra note 88, at 1645-47.
190. M. DANIELSON, supra note 26, at 40.
191. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 37, at 29-32.
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for residential uses is restricted to single-family housing."'' 92
The central message of most of part one of this article, in short, is that
there are several reasons why housing segregation and discrimination de-
veloped and continue even though they are contrary to federal law. The
causes are complex, but the effects are clear. 93 Minorities suffer from gov-
ernmental and private practices that may be rationalized on myriad
grounds, yet too often are intended to discriminate. In most instances in-
tent is difficult to prove, and the federal government is usually extremely
reluctant to act with force. The extent to which the government has re-
sponded, and how that response could and should be improved, is the sub-
ject of discussion in part two.
II. THE LEGAL RESPONSE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The remainder of this article addresses the nine variables summarized in
the introduction. More specifically, in social science terms, there is an at-
tempt to demonstrate support for nine hypotheses regarding fair housing
enforcement by the federal government. These are: (A) active federal in-
volvement is a basic prerequisite for fair housing implementation; (B) fed-
eral fair housing enforcement agencies are essential for effective
implementation; (C) implementation of equal opportunity in housing is
more successful where policy goals are clearly stated; (D) a precondition
for full fair housing implementation is having monitoring agencies estab-
lish precise standards for measuring compliance; (E) administrative per-
sonnel responsible for fair housing implementation must be committed to
that purpose; (F) the commitment of the enforcer's superiors affects the
behavior of those directly responsible within federal agencies for enforce-
ment; (G) administrative coordination is imperative for fair housing laws
to be successfully implemented; (H) benefits of complying with fair hous-
ing policies must outweigh related costs in order for them to be enforced;
and (I) the attitudes and actions of those who gain advantages from fair
housing implementation affect whether there will be vigorous enforcement
in the future.
A. Active Federal Involvement
Until President Johnson and Congress joined forces to pass the Civil
Rights Act of 1968,194 commonly referred to as the Fair Housing Act, the
192. M. DANIELSON, supra note 26, at 52-53.
193. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 37, at 7.
194. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976). The other major federal laws designed to promote
equal housing opportunity include Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
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federal government remained almost totally passive and rarely took note-
worthy steps toward the goal of achieving equal housing opportunity. 95
Needless to say, there has never been any supplanting of local or state
authority with regard to fair housing as there has been in the field of voting
rights.' 96 Therefore, the chief recourse for those discriminated against
prior to 1968 was costly and time-consuming private litigation.
Yet, even prior to the passage of the Fair Housing Act, other federal
laws were long ignored that could have been utilized by the federal gov-
ernment to fight housing discrimination. Two of the oldest concern the
relevant provisions of the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866. The fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."' 9 7 For decades these provisions for due process and equal protec-
tion were not construed by the federal government to support the concept
of fair housing. And while the Civil Rights Act of 1866 explicitly requires
that "all citizens of the United States . . . [have] the same right, in every
state and territory, as enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, or convey real and personal property,"' 98 this
statutory provision was similarly not enforced for over a century. 199 It was
only with the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. A/fred H Mayer Co. "
that the actual intent of the 1866 Act was officially recognized. In Jones,
the Court held for the first time that the 1866 Act was designed to prohibit
§ 2000d (1976), providing for nondiscrimination in federally assisted programs; Exec. Order
No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (1962), which prohibits discrimination because of race,
color, creed, or national origin in housing financed through federal assistance; the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, which among other things amended Title VIII
by prohibiting sex discrimination in the rental and sale of homes, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976);
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, which directs lending institutions to keep data
on the number and dollar amount of mortgages and home improvement loans that they
originated and purchased, along with the location of each loan by census tract or zip code,
12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1976); and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, which forbids
discrimination by creditors on the basis of sex, martial status, race, color, religion, national
origin, or age, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)-(f) (1976).
195. Lamb, Presidential Fair Housing Policies, supra note 1, at 619-20. See also T. DYE,
THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY 67-68 (1971); H. RODGERS & C. BULLOCK, supra note 1, at 139.
196. With regard to the supplanting of state and local power in the area of voting rights,
see C. HAMILTON, THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND BLACK
VOTERS, ch. 10 (1973); H. RODGERS & C. BULLOCK, supra note 1, 17-37.
197. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
198. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
199. The 1866 Act had no provision for administrative enforcement but, instead, placed
the burden of proof on an injured party bringing a law suit in federal district court. Ch. 31,
14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982.
200. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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all forms of racial discrimination in both public and private housing, and
that the Act constituted a proper exercise of congressional power under the
thirteenth amendment which outlaws slavery.
Hence, for far too long the federal government largely turned its back to
the seemingly intractable problem of housing discrimination and treated it
as purely a form of defacto discrimination which was viewed as legal, of
course, because state and local governments rarely had enacted laws that
explicitly excluded minorities from living in white neighborhoods. The
major exceptions to this lax federal posture are found in two prominent
Supreme Court decisions. In Buchanan v. Warley,2 ' the Court announced
that local zoning ordinances explicitly forbidding housing for blacks in
"Caucasian" communities were unconstitutional.2" 2 Buchanan thus stimu-
lated an alternative to anti-black zoning ordinances: the development of
private restrictive covenants through which white purchasers of housing
agreed in writing not to sell or lease their property at a later date to mem-
bers of certain racial, religious, and ethnic groups.20 3 These private agree-
ments were upheld and enforced by state courts with increasing frequency,
and since state action then became involved, the Supreme Court finally
ruled that these restrictive covenants were unconstitutional in the
landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer." Unfortunately, since Buchanan,
Shelley, and Jones, the Supreme Court has retreated into a shell and has
handed down few decisions that outlaw more subtle forms of housing dis-
crimination.20 5
While endeavors to bring about open housing for minorities reached
high tide in 1968 with the Fair Housing Act and Jones, the election of
Richard Nixon in the same year threw a damper on emerging progress.20 6
The leadership provided by both Presidents Nixon and Ford was in fact
minimal in the area of fair housing, and as a consequence the effectiveness
of fair housing implementation declined significantly. 2 7 Even the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development openly admitted at the end of
eight years of Republican White House control that "[a]lthough the Fed-
eral Fair Housing Law, Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, has been in
effect for nearly a decade, residential segregation and overt discrimination
201. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
202. See, e.g., C. VOSE, supra note 51, at 3-4.
203. Id at 4-5.
204. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
205. See note 90 and accompanying text supra; Sloane, supra note 186.
206. Lamb, Presidential Fair Housing Policies, supra note 1, at 633-40; Mitchell, Moods
and Changes.- The Civil Rights Record of the Nixon Administration, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW.
63 (1973).
207. Lamb, Presidential Fair Housing Policies, supra note 1, at 637-49.
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in housing continue."2 8 Here then we have an illustration of the primary
federal agency responsible for implementing fair housing laws publicly ac-
knowledging that it had for the most part failed to carry out one of its
cardinal duties.209
The Carter administration took a more active stance on fair housing
enforcement. 21° For example, unlike during the Nixon and Ford years,
the Carter administration cautioned some cities and suburbs that federal
funds would be terminated if low- and moderate-income housing was not
spread throughout larger urban areas and throughout smaller suburban
communities. 211 More importantly, President Carter endorsed the need
for strengthening enforcement powers under Title VIII and thus fair hous-
ing implementation. As Carter commented in his 1979 State of the Union
Message: "We need to correct a weakness in an existing civil-rights law.
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which prohibits discrimination
in housing, remains largely an empty promise because of the lack of an
adequate enforcement mechanism., 212 Yet the enforcement effort under
Carter did not move quickly to fulfill that "empty promise." The Carter
administration was not sufficiently aggressive to correct present or to com-
pensate for past discrimination, and the "new HUD" that former HUD
Secretary Patricia Roberts Harris promised was not forthcoming either
under her leadership or that of her successor as HUD Secretary, Moon
Landrieu. Consequently, in 1979 the Commission on Civil Rights again
announced an old, familiar theme-the federal government's fair housing
implementation effort was still handicapped by significant problems, in-
cluding the fact that "[t]hose Federal departments and agencies charged
with ensuring equal housing opportunity have not adequately carried out
their duty. 213
208. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT: FAIR HOUSING 1976 1 (1977).
209. Title VIII designates HUD as the central or lead agency in the federal government's
fair housing enforcement effort in the following words: "All executive departments and
agencies shall administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban devel-
opment in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of this subchapter andshall cooper-
ate with the Secretary [of HUDI to further such purposes." 42 U.S.C. § 3608(c) (1976)
(emphasis supplied).
210. Lamb, Presidential Fair Housing Policies, supra note 1, at 649-59.
211. Id at 655; Interview with William F. Kerrigan, Program Analyst, Office of Fair
Housing and Equal Opportunity, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Wash-
ington, D.C. (July 31, 1980).
212. Hearings, supra note 64, at 4 (quoting President Carter).
213. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT 230 (1979). For details regarding HUD, see id at 231-32.
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B. Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Agencies
Under Title VIII, all federal agencies have the legal responsibility of
promoting equal housing opportunity to the extent possible in their pro-
grams.2 4 For our purposes, however, only seven of these enforcement
agencies need to be singled out for attention: the Federal Housing Admin-
istration (FHA), the Veterans Administration (VA), the Federal Reserve
System (FRS), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the
Comptroller of the Currency (COC), the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB), and, most importantly, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). That all these agencies have failed, to varying de-
grees, to fulfill their legal assignment to affirmatively carry out fair housing
laws is reflected in the fact that the National Committee Against Discrimi-
nation in Housing has initiated litigation against each over a period of
years.215
Prior to the creation of HUD in 1965, the FHA was the principal federal
enforcement agency in the field of fair housing.2 16 But it is no secret that
the FHA's enforcement record has traditionally been pathetic. Indeed, the
FHA has actually contributed to housing discrimination throughout most of
its history:
For 15 years, for example, the FHA Underwriting Manual
warned of the infiltration of "inharmonious racial groups" into
neighborhoods occupied by families of a different race. FHA ac-
tively promoted the use of a model racially-restrictive covenant
by builders and owners whose properties would receive FHA in-
surance. This policy was in full effect during the first 5 years of
the building boom after the Second World War, when over
900,000 units of FHA housing were produced.21 7
The FHA has not completely changed its policies, even today, to be largely
consonant with the nation's fair housing laws. Thus, one of the most com-
prehensive studies ever published on the FHA found that even in recent
years "FHA policies and practices with respect to equal opportunity persist
in the historical pattern of lagging behind the state of the law" as outlined
in Title VIII.218
A second federal agency with primary fair housing enforcement duties is
214. See note 209 supra.
215. Hearings, supra note 64, at 98.
216. FHA merged with HUD in 1965. Id
217. TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING, supra note 58,
at 39-40.
218. Rubinowitz & Trosman, supra note 1, at 496. See also Silverman, supra note 25, at
88-89.
19811
Catholic University Law Review
the Veterans Administration, which among other things assists veterans in
purchasing homes through VA low-interest loans.219 However, the VA's
carrying out of its enforcement responsibilities has traditionally been no
better than that of the FHA. Indeed, the VA's record on this score has
been quite similar to that of the FHA. The Commission on Civil Rights
has therefore concluded that "VA administrative policies with respect to
segregation [have] closely parallelled those of FHA. 22° More specifically:
FHA and VA housing for the most part has benefitted moderate
to middle-income families. Thus, many minorities have not been
eligible for FHA mortgage insurance or VA loan guarantees sim-
ply on the basis of income. Moreover, until very recently home-
ownership opportunity for minorities at virtually all income
levels has been restricted to older housing. Older housing fre-
quently has failed to meet minimum FHA and VA construction
requirements and, therefore, has not been eligible for FHA insur-
ance or VA loan guarantees.221
In addition, for years neither the VA nor the FHA advertised their housing
programs for open occupancy, and they failed to encourage builders to
take steps to attract minority purchasers.222
Not until the Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer2 23 did the
FHA and the VA change their policies encouraging housing segregation
and restrictive covenants. 224 Yet the failure to encourage separate housing
markets does not, of course, mean that either agency began to push aggres-
sively for desegregation. In fact, neither the VA nor the FHA has ever
actively supported housing desegregation.225 As a consequence, for exam-
ple, in 1979 the VA still did not "monitor compliance with the fair housing
certificates it [had obtained] from brokers, builders, and other program
219. See THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE . . . FOR
FAIR HOUSING, supra note 172, at 219; THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EF-
FORT, supra note 213, at 108.
220. TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING, supra note 57,
at 40.
221. Id
222. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EF-
FORT: ONE YEAR LATER 64 (1971).
223. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
224. TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING, SUpra note 57,
at 40. After Shelley, "FHA and VA ruled that they would not provide mortgage insurance
for property on which restrictive covenants were recorded after February 15, 1950. In 1951,
FHA announced that all repossessed, FHA-insured housing would be administered and sold
on a nonsegregated basis." Id However, "[tihese changes had little real effect in increasing
minority participation in FHA and VA programs on an integrated basis." Id at 41.
225. With respect to the VA, for example, see THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCE-
MENT EFFORT, supra note 213, at 266-327.
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participants. Moreover, VA's complaint handling [was] poor, and there
[was] considerable evidence that the minorities applying for loans from VA
[did] not receive as favorable treatment as nonminorities. ' 226
The fair housing activities of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board can be examined in conjunction since all
four are federal financial regulatory agencies.227 In other words, these four
agencies, taken as a whole, regulate the mortgage lending practices of the
vast majority of all American banks and savings and loan institutions. As
late as the mid- 1970s, the FHLBB was the only federal financial regulatory
agency issuing regulations reaffirming the fact that discrimination based
on race, national origin, and color was illegal, and it was the only agency
that had overtly discouraged sex discrimination in housing.228 On the
other hand, "[nione of the four financial regulatory agencies [had] required
its regulatees to develop affirmative action programs regarding the en-
forcement of Title VIII. ' '229 Yet, as the decade of the eighties approached,
all four agencies had improved their performance in fair housing in some
ways. As illustrations, these agencies had proposed or issued guidelines
and regulations reminding lenders that they must discontinue certain dis-
criminatory practices, and the agencies had also required the collection of
data on mortgage application forms.230 Overall, however, the federal
financial regulatory agencies are not fully meeting their civil rights imple-
mentation responsibilities. In 1979, these agencies had generally "taken in-
sufficient corrective action when Title VIII [had] been violated and [had]
not satisfactorily monitored the remedial steps which lenders [had] prom-
ised."23' These key shortcomings and others suggest that all four agencies
still have a long way to go before they meet either the letter or the spirit of
the 1968 Fair Housing Act.
Since its creation in 1965, the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment has been the main federal executive branch agency responsible for
enforcing the promise of equal housing opportunity. Specifically, HUD's
Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity has been assigned the job
of overseeing fair housing in the programs that HUD administers nation-
226. Id at 232.
227. See, e.g., id at 165-70; THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To
PROVIDE. . . FOR FAIR HOUSING, supra note 172, at 134-208.
228. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE. . . FOR FAIR
HOUSING, supra note 172, at 334-35.
229. Id. at 335.
230. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 213, at 76.
231. Id at 232.
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wide.2 32 Although HUD has generally come closer to meeting its fair
housing duties than have the above six agencies, for the past fifteen years
HUD has still only partially met its designated legal role.2 33 For example,
in 1971 HUD had too small a fair housing staff to implement its responsi-
bilities, and it had not effectively used the enforcement tools or the fair
housing budget given it by Congress.2 34 By 1975, HUD was still taking a
case-by-case approach to fighting housing discrimination, relying upon in-
dividual complaints as an indicator of discrimination rather than actively
conducting compliance reviews in metropolitan areas or specific communi-
ties that were known to discriminate against minorities.235 HUD had also
allowed a large number of housing discrimination complaints to accumu-
late without resolution;2 36 it had permitted the conciliation process to be
extended for long periods of time;237 it had referred few cases of discrimi-
nation to the Department of Justice for law suits; 238 it had not monitored
compliance agreements effectively;2 39 it had not issued regulations against
sex discrimination in housing;24° and most importantly, it had rarely im-
posed sanctions such as the termination of funding for those known to
discriminate.24' Although HUD has resolved some of these shortcomings,
as of 1979 a number of others continued as before. Its complaint process-
ing mechanisms were still ad hoc in nature, oriented toward individual
complaints.242 Where communities had entered into voluntary compliance
agreements with HUD, those agreements were not being monitored.24 3
HUD's organizational structure and staffing were not conducive to full im-
plementation of its fair housing duties. 2" The enforcement of Title VIII
was only one of several jobs placed on the shoulders of the Assistant Secre-
tary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, and hence Title VIII still
did not receive the emphasis that it should have received at HUD.245
HUD's field staff which monitors Title VIII was not directly answerable to
232. Id at 12-14.
233. See generally Lamb, Presidential Fair Housing Policies, supra note I, at 633-59.
234. FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 222, at 348.
235. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE . . . FOR FAIR
HOUSING, supra note 172, at 329.
236. Id. at 330.
237. Id
238. Id at 231.
239. Id
240. Id
241. Id at 330.
242. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 213, at 231.
243. Id
244. Id
245. Id at 12, 231.
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the Assistant Secretary but, instead, to HUD field officials who were pri-
marily concerned with general housing programs, not civil rights.246 Nor,
as of 1979, had HUD issued comprehensive regulations explicitly defining
what constituted housing discrimination in violation of Title VIII.247
While HUD is designated by the Fair Housing Act as the "lead agency"
241 iw fresponsible for the Act's implementation, in view of the above weak-
nesses it cannot be said that HUD is serving as a model that other agencies
with fair housing enforcement responsibilities can or should emulate com-
pletely.
C. Clarity of Policy Goals
The two main pieces of federal legislation which prohibit housing dis-
cimination are Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and, more signifi-
cantly, as we have seen, Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. However,
both of these enactments have some vague, weak provisions and fail to
state forcefully what precisely shall be the law of the land with regard to
fair housing or how it shall be implemented. The same is true with respect
to many regulations of federal agencies directed by law to eliminate hous-
ing discrimination through their own regulatory procedures and guide-
lines.
249
Title VI is so broadly stated that it has very rarely been relied upon to
fight actively housing discrimination and segregation in America. In
sweeping language it declares that "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance., 25 ° Though
surely no one would contest the fact that federal financial assistance in the
form of housing falls within the intent of Title VI, three years after its
passage HUD had terminated no funds nor even convened any hearings
with regard to the law's implementation. 2.1 By 197 1, there was still "little
activity by HUD" in enforcing Title VI. 25 2 By 1975, HUD was continuing
to conduct Title VI compliance reviews only where formal complaints had
been filed.2 53 The agency had also allowed many complaints to become
246. Id at 231.
247. Id
248. See note 209 supra.
249. Lamb, Presidential Fair Housing Policies, supra note 1, at 642-44.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
251. Comment, supra note 12, at 994.
252. FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 222, at 349.
253. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE... FOR FAIR
HOUSING, supra note 172, at 329.
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backlogged, not acting upon them with dispatch.254 And by 1977, al-
though the number of Title VI complaints filed with HUD had substan-
tially decreased over the prior two years, a backlog still existed.255 Of the
eighty-seven Title VI complaints filed with HUD in 1977, the agency de-
cided that there was noncompliance in only six cases, and on the average it
took HUD 202 days to resolve these complaints. 6 This delay in resolving
Title VI complaints is primarily due to HUD's vague and inadequate regu-
lations. They indicate that Title VI investigations shall be "prompt," but
that term simply is not defined in the regulations.257
The Civil Rights Act of 1968 is far more explicit in declaring unfair
housing practices to be illegal. Title VIII contains a totally unambiguous,
forceful statement that "[ilt is the policy of the United States to provide,
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States.,258 Title VIII, as amended, goes on to prohibit discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the sale or rental
of both private and public housing.259 The only instances in which Title
VIII does not apply are those involving single family dwellings sold or
rented without the use of a broker and without being advertised as un-
available to the above protected classes, and, second, a housing facility for
up to four families within which the owner also resides.26°
Despite the clarity of its general intent, Title VIII is plagued by vague-
ness on a number of specific points crucial to the civil rights implementa-
tion process. In 1979, former HUD Secretary Robert C. Weaver pointed
out some of these ambiguities.261 For example, there is no precise defini-
tion of what constitutes "fair housing" under Title VIII. 26 2 Title VIII is
vague regarding whether racial redlining and discrimination in property
insurance is outlawed.26 3 Nor does the fair housing law make clear the
type of relief that courts can provide in Title VIII litigation, and especially
whether money damages can be awarded to those subjected to discrimina-
tion.26' The statutory reliance on the Justice Department also permits too
much discretion regarding whether legal action will be pursued by the fed-
254. Id. at 330.
255. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 213, at 37.
256. Id. at 37-38.
257. Id at 38.
258. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976).
259. Id. § 3604(a)-(e) (1976).
260. Id § 3603(b) (1976).
261. Hearings, supra note 64, at 94-100.
262. Id at 94.
263. Id. at 97.
264. Id at 100.
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eral government. In many instances the Justice Department has decided
not to ask for an injunction or to file a law suit-even though HUD has
discovered a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of Title
VIII. 265 Indeed, over the past few years the Department of Justice "has
initiated no important litigation against suburban housing exclusion." 266
It is therefore with respect to the likelihood of legal action, as well as to the
factors of statutory ambiguity alluded to above, that Title VIII standards
are not stated with clarity and force. Since fair housing implementation is
often dependent on a viable threat of litigation by the Department of Jus-
tice, this is one key reason why Title VIII has had a limited impact on
widespread practices involving housing discrimination and segregation in
the United States.
Beyond these statutory ambiguities, Title VIII also contains weaknesses
that have severely hampered its aggressive implementation by the federal
executive branch. First, the law limits HUD investigations only to in-
stances where a housing discrimination complaint has been filed. 267 Even
if a community is notoriously known to engage in a variety of exclusionary
practices, HUD cannot commence enforcement activities unless these
practices are spelled out in a formal complaint. Second, under Title VIII
third parties not directly affected by discrimination cannot file a complaint
with HUD.2 68 This precludes civil rights interest groups from fully mobil-
izing their resources to help fight housing discrimination in many cases.
Third, and most importantly, HUD is given very limited enforcement
powers under Title VIII.2 69 In the words of former HUD Secretary Patri-
cia Roberts Harris, Title VIII "is a law without teeth., 270 The agency must
rely upon the methods of "conference, conciliation, and persuasion" to re-
solve disputes between those who allegedly discriminated and those who
were allegedly discriminated against.27' Unlike the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission,272 HUD is not currently authorized to initiate
law suits in federal district court in instances where discrimination is ap-
265. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE. . . FOR FAIR
HOUSING, supra note 172, at 128-30; THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT,
supra note 213, at 57.
266. Orfield, Federal Agencies and Urban Segregation.- Steps Toward Coordinated Action,
RACIAL SEGREGATION: Two POLICY VIEWS 13 (Ford Foundation ed. 1979).
267. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 213, at 230.
268. Id
269. Id
270. Hearings, supra note 64, at 21.
271. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1976).
272. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT: To ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 474 (1975).
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parent or even blatant.273 Nor can HUD request a federal court to issue
an injunction or a restraining order to halt temporarily discriminatory
practices, but must instead refer cases involving a pattern or practice of
discrimination to the Department of Justice for possible prosecution.274
Of further significance is the fact that Title VIII does not require that data
be provided to HUD by those who receive federal housing funds and are
thus regulated by HUD.275 This necessarily leads to little specificity in the
standards used in evaluating compliance with the legislation and, indeed,
difficulty on the part of HUD in determining whether there has been com-
pliance with Title VIII that has not been addressed by HUD regulations.
For example, HUD has not issued regulations to guide other federal agen-
cies pursuant to its responsibility as the lead agency in enforcing Title
VIII, or regulations pertaining to the discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing, discrimination in the financing of housing, and discrimination by
brokerage services.276 Even when HUD regulations have been forthcom-
ing, they have too frequently lacked the clarity and specificity needed to
enforce Title VIII fully.
277
D. Monitoring and Precise Standards
For federal civil rights laws to be implemented effectively, federal agen-
cies cannot just sit back and rely upon the case-by-case process of acting
only when and if formal individual discrimination complaints are filed.
That process is far too slow and has far too limited an impact in fighting
discrimination and segregation. 278 To bring about relatively rapid change
in any field of civil rights, including fair housing, federal agencies must
assert themselves by regularly monitoring the extent to which civil rights
laws are being complied with, and apply stringent sanctions uniformly
when there is noncompliance. 279 Regarding fair housing, this especially
calls for the use of community-wide pattern and practice reviews so that
neighborhoods or even entire cities and their suburbs can be detected in
any illegal attempts to keep minorities out.28° In addition, precise agency
273. Hearings, supra note 64, at 23, 59-61, 102.
274. See text accompanying notes 265-66.
275. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 213, at 230.
276. Id at 26.
277. Id
278. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE.. . FOR FAIR
HOUSING, supra note 172, at 330.
279. Id See generally H. RODGERS & C. BULLOCK, COERCION TO COMPLIANCE (1976);
Bullock & Rodgers, supra note 4.
280. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE... FOR FAIR
HousING, supra note 172, at 346, 348.
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standards must be established to prohibit such discrimination, and regular
follow-up compliance reviews are absolutely essential.28" '
But so far, no federal agency has met the majority of its responsibilities
to monitor fair housing efforts with precise standards. Before such moni-
toring can take place, an agency must first have the quantity and quality of
data that permit a determination of housing discrimination.282 Once such
data are available, an agency must then issue regulations establishing
quantifiable standards for compliance. To date most federal agencies have
not even required those that they regulate to collect adequate data regard-
ing fair housing.283 And even where they have, quantifiable standards for
identifying the presence of housing discrimination either have not been
issued as regulations, or the regulations are so vague as to be of very mar-
ginal value.284
Consider, for example, the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment-again, statutorily named as the lead agency in promoting and im-
plementing the Fair Housing Act of 1968.285 As of 1970, HUD had not
even begun gathering the racial and ethnic data necessary for determining
whether housing discrimination existed in the programs that it funded and
administered.286 The following year, data had been collected which con-
clusively demonstrated that substantial segregation was occurring in HUD
programs and that HUD compliance reviews were "desperately
needed.,287 By 1974, some progress had been made, and HUD was col-
lecting data for most of its programs.288 These data were not regularly
used, though, by HUD field representatives actually involved in imple-
menting fair housing goals.289 Moreover, HUD had not collected data on
the racial and ethnic make-up of most single-family dwelling neighbor-
hoods where HUD housing was being built, thus making it impossible to
determine whether those communities were receiving HUD funds while
still practicing discrimination. 291 Since the mid-1970s, however, HUD has
281. Id
282. Id at 116-19. See generally Bogen & Falcon, The Use of Racial Statistics in Fair
Housing Cases, 34 MD. L. REV. 59 (1974).
283. See, e.g., THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE . . .
FOR FAIR HOUSING, supra note 172, at 333, 335, 340, 350-51, 353.
284. Id
285. See note 209 supra.
286. FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 222, at 150, 349.
287. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT: ONE YEAR LATER 44 (1971).
288. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE . .. FOR FAIR
HOUSING, supra note 172, at 116.
289. Id at 118.
290. Id at 118-19.
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apparently improved its data collection and usage.29 '
On-site compliance reviews or inspections are another crucial compo-
nent of an adequate fair housing monitoring system. Still, five years after
the passage of Title VIII, HUD had failed to conduct a single compliance
review and claimed that even when it began employing such reviews, it
would do so only where there were already clear indications of housing
discrimination.292 Even the latest information available indicates that
HUD has not conducted on-site inspections regularly or frequently enough
to meet its fair housing enforcement duties assigned by law. For example,
HUD area offices are responsible for monitoring affirmative fair housing
marketing plans. However, "[i]n the Atlanta region, no monitoring was
conducted by area offices in fiscal year 1976. In the Seattle region, only 13
plans were subjected to on-site monitoring by area offices, representing 3
percent of all plans received in that year.",293 And in instances where mon-
itoring has detected practices that require a full compliance review, such
reviews have not been forthcoming in too many instances. Only sixty-
three compliance reviews were conducted for the entire year of 1977, rep-
resenting less than 0.3 percent of all HUD-approved affirmative fair hous-
ing marketing plans.294 This is substantial evidence of an essentially
passive role in civil rights implementation that must be corrected by HUD.
The size and training of a federal agency's civil rights staff are also key
ingredients making for acceptable monitoring programs. In 1971, HUD
had "a staff grossly inadequate" for executing its fair housing responsibili-
ties. This staff consisted of a mere forty-one employees to deal with all
Title VIII complaints filed nationwide, meaning that it took anywhere
from five to twelve months to resolve complaints. 295 By 1975, HUD had a
larger number of fair housing employees but was still understaffed to carry
out its duties. 296 Hence, with respect to the size of HUD's enforcement
staff, there has been progress, though seemingly not enough.
The quality of training given to HUD's equal opportunity staff is even
more questionable. Prior to 1973, HUD's training program was disorga-
nized, and by 1973 the agency was only slowly developing the early stages
of a training program-unsystematic in nature-for its Washington staff
291. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 213, at 52-67.
292. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT-A REASSESSMENT 34 (1973).
293. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 213, at 23.
294. Id.
295. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: ONE YEAR LATER, supra
note 287, at 41.
296. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE ... FOR FAIR
HOUSING, supra note 172, at 16.
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members.297 At that time, too, fair housing staffers in the HUD regional
offices were receiving "little or no training. "298 By 1975, however, HUD's
training program was considerably improved, with four weeks of class-
room instruction provided in Washington, plus on-the-job training of up
to eight additional weeks. 299 Nonetheless, by 1979 HUD had allowed its
training program to back-slide to the point where equal opportunity train-
ing was again receiving little attention.3" In the words of the Commission
on Civil Rights, "[n]ot only have junior civil rights staff been poorly
trained, but sometimes the equal opportunity directors in area offices and
even directors in Regional Offices of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity
have also not received proper training." '' The Commission gave a
number of other illustrations of how HUD has recently been neglecting the
civil rights training of both its fair housing and general programmatic
staff.302 Apparently, then, it is relatively easy for federal training programs
in civil rights implementation to reach a high level of proficiency, only to
deteriorate in a short period of time.
E. Commitment of Fair Housing Personnel
Pinpointing the degree to which federal civil rights enforcement officials
are committed to their implementation tasks is largely a subjective-per-
haps even an intuitive-question. Nevertheless, there are certainly some
subjective statements that can be made about the commitment of the per-
sonnel at various federal agencies regarding fair housing implementation
with which few would disagree. For instance, some of the discussion in the
preceding sections relating to HUD is applicable to the question of com-
mitment and thus need not be repeated. It is more revealing here to focus
on other agencies.
As mentioned earlier, the Federal Housing Administration and the Vet-
erans Administration provide further examples regarding this variable, for
they have had notorious reputations for contributing to housing discrimi-
nation-a clear indication of virtually a total lack of commitment to fair
housing principles.3"3 In fact, the policies of these two agencies have at
times been in direct contradiction of federal fair housing laws. If we take
297. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-A REASSESSMENT, supra
note 292, at 39.
298. Id.
299. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE . . . FOR FAIR
HOUSING, supra note 172, at 27-28.
300. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 213, at 19.
301. Id
302. Id
303. See text accompanying notes 217-26 supra.
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the Veterans Administration as an illustration, we find that, throughout its
history, one of that agency's highest priorities has been to provide loans for
housing white veterans and their families, with fair housing being one of
the lowest priorities of the agency-if indeed it can be called a "prior-
ity."'3° This is reflected in the fact that three years after the enactment of
Title VIII, and three years after the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v.
AlfredH Mayer Co. ," the VA would only conduct a compliance review if
a formal complaint had been filed with the agency.3" 6 If it were deter-
mined that a builder had been engaging in a discriminatory practice, VA
would merely require the builder to provide housing for the complainant,
not housing for others similarly situated.3 °7 And, in 1971, VA had con-
ducted no surveys to determine the extent to which minorities occupied
housing accommodations in VA subdivisions. 308 Moreover, the VA's loan
guaranty program was staffed by only two employees whose primary re-
sponsibilities involved civil rights. Specifically, "two professional civil
rights staff members were expected to monitor the entire VA loan guaranty
program carried out in fifty-seven regional offices and amounting to more
than $3 billion in guaranteed mortgage loans annually," and, to make
things even worse, a year later one of those two positions was elimi-
nated.3 9 Thus, the Commission on Civil Rights concluded that "[t]he fac-
tors of inadequate staff, racial and ethnic data which are not readily
retrievable, and an absence of written procedures for conducting compli-
ance reviews for enforcing equal opportunity requirements, taken together,
strongly indicate that there is virtually no civil rights monitoring of VA
housing programs at the present time."3 ' This of course translates into a
lack of commitment by VA officials and an apparent absence of desire on
their part to strengthen the VA enforcement program.
Subsequent investigations by the Civil Rights Commission discovered
only slight indications of a greater commitment on the part of Veterans
Administration personnel to carry out their fair housing responsibilities. In
1973, the Commission found that its 1971 recommendations to VA were
"still at the planning stage" and that, again, "VA's fair housing effort [lack-
304. Cf EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA, supra note 37, at 38 (FHA policy).
305. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
306. FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 222, at 164.
307. Id
308. Id.
309. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: ONE YEAR LATER, supra
note 287, at 62.
310. Id at 66.
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ed] a fulltime director and [was] severely understaffed." '311 In 1975, VA
still did not require that the lenders with which it dealt promise nondis-
crimination in their lending practices, it still had an extemely small equal
opportunity staff, and it provided no equal opportunity training.312 By
1979, VA had only three equal opportunity employees overseeing billions
of dollars used to assist veterans.31 3 It is somewhat doubtful that one
could find a better example of a comparable lack of commitment on the
part of equal opportunity personnel in any other federal agency, regardless
of its mission. However, the related fair housing activities of the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Comptroller of the Currency may come reasonably close.314
F Commitment of the Enforcer's Superiors
When a President and his political appointees heading federal agencies
view civil rights implementation to be a low administration priority, this
has a chilling effect upon even the most dedicated federal employees re-
sponsible for implementing civil rights.315 The forcefulness of the civil
rights enforcement activities of federal agencies, in other words, reflects
presidential priorities which cannot be easily offset by the actions of ca-
reer-level bureaucrats working in civil rights. The President has the duty
to enforce the civil rights laws and the power to remove high level execu-
tive branch appointees that fail to promote effective implementation. As
always, in every area of public policy, the "buck stops" at the President's
desk in the Oval Office.
The impact that a conservative administration can have on antidis-
crimination implementation is readily demonstrated by an examination of
the Nixon and Ford years. Richard Nixon's support for equal employ-
311. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-A REASSESSMENT, .upra
note 292, at 44.
312. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE ... FOR FAIR
HOUSING, supra note 172, at 338-39.
313. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 213, at 107.
314. Id at 214-18.
315. In the words of Longaker, "[wlhere the law assists minority groups, as do the civil
rights statutes and many court decisions, [the president] must make clear without cavil or
doubt, that it will be enforced." R. LONGAKER, THE PRESIDENCY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBER-
TIES 196 (1961). Or as put by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, absent presidential
leadership in civil rights enforcement there develops "a steady erosion of the progress to-
ward equal rights, equal justice and equal protection of the law." THE FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-A REASSESSMENT, supra note 292, at 11. See generaly M.
ABERNATHY, CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 91-94 (3d ed. 1977); Lamb, Presi-
dential Leadershp, Government Reorganization, and Equal Employment Opportunity, supra
note 1.
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ment opportunity and especially school desegregation was luke-warm, to
say the least.31 6 But his position on fair housing was even less support-
ive-even more chilling. Although occasionally giving lip-service to the
principle of equal opportunity in housing,317 Nixon's actual policies were
totally alien to the bare essentials of that concept.3"' He refused to take
actions to discourage the use of exclusionary practices by local govern-
ments. Rather than acknowledge the fact that such practices are primarily
designed to keep minorities out of white areas, Nixon camouflaged the
issue in economic terms. He would not, under any conditions, "impose
economic integration" on communities that opposed the building of feder-
ally subsidized low-income housing, despite the fact that such communi-
ties typically do provide adequate federally assisted housing for poor
whites, including the elderly.3" 9 More generally, he would not, under any
conditions, allow then HUD Secretary George Romney to promote open
housing in white suburbs. 320 Nor would he continue to support the con-
cept of federally subsidized housing, essentially terminating all such pro-
grams in 1973 by placing an eighteen-month freeze on funds appropriated
by Congress for that purpose.32'
President Ford's record was not much better, for his administration did
little to implement the letter and the spirit of the fair housing laws. 322
Consider for example the fair housing activities of HUD under Ford's
leadership. HUD regulations tended to be ineffective in meeting congres-
sional intent in fair housing and were of limited success in providing low-
income housing to minorities.323 Indeed, HUD officials frankly admitted
that they were doing a poor job of monitoring whether the civil rights re-
quirements of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
were being met.324 This Act was designed to open new housing opportuni-
ties for minorities and the poor outside of ghettos and inner cities.325 But
since Ford, like his predecessor, opposed "economic integration," HUD
regulations fell short of meeting the congressionally established goal of
316. H. RODGERS & C. BULLOCK, supra note 1, at 97-104, 126-27.
317. See Statement of the President on Federal Policies Relative to Equal Housing Oppor-
tunity, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 892-903.
318. Lamb, Presidential Fair Housing Policies, supra note 1, at 635-40.
319. Id at 635.
320. M. DANIELSON, supra note 26, at 205-06.
321. D. FALK & H. FRANKLIN, supra note 56, at 12-13; Lamb, Presidential Fair Housing
Policies, supra note 1, at 638-39.
322. Id. at 641-49.
323. Id at 642.
324. HUD Assistant Secretary Blair Hits Block Grant Civil Rights Monitoring, [1975] 3
Hous. & DEV. REP. 538 (BNA).
325. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 101(c)(6), 88 Stat. 633 (1974).
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housing desegregation through the dispersal of minorities and the poor
throughout larger metropolitan areas.326 Moreover, Ford's 1976 proposals
to Congress so neglected housing for low-income families that the Com-
mission on Civil Rights, in a relatively rare burst of political rhetoric, bit-
terly criticized the administration's stance.32 7 Like Nixon, Ford was
obviously more interested in winning the support of middle-class white
voters than he was in implementing the nation's fair housing laws. Ford
candidly stated in public that the concept of open housing did not describe
his administration's policies.328 Similarly, Carla Hills, Ford's Secretary for
Housing and Urban Development, argued that "home ownership for the
poor is probably an unrealistic goal" and that low-income families were
simply incapable of coping with problems involved in home ownership.
329
The Carter administration had a substantially better track record in fair
housing than did its two Republican predecessors. Among other things,
new regulations were issued by the Federal Reserve System to outlaw the
practice of redlining in the granting of home mortgages, 330 and HUD lead-
ers were reasonably outspoken on the need to fight housing discrimination
and to provide more low-income housing in the suburbs.331 And, as men-
tioned earlier, President Carter announced that he strongly supported 1979
congressional attempts to increase considerably the enforcement powers of
HUD in fighting housing discrimination.332 These and other indicators
definitely distinguish Carter from Nixon and Ford as a supportive supe-
rior, although ideally the Carter administration could have been far more
supportive than it actually was in fair housing implementation.
G. Administrative Coordination
Coordination of civil rights implementation activities, where different
federal agencies possess overlapping responsibilities, has also been an im-
pediment to sound civil rights enforcement.3 33 As the 1980s opened, sig-
nificant strides had been taken to resolve enforcement coordination
326. Lamb, Presidential Fair Housing Policies, supra note i, at 653.
327. TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING, supra note 57,
at 33.
328. President's Remarks in a Question-and-Answer Session With a Panel of ASNE
Members, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 650, 653.
329. Krause, Home Ownership by Poor "Unrealistic," Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 1975, § A, at
1, col. 4 (quoting Secretary Hills).
330. 12 C.F.R. § 203 (1980).
331. Lamb, Presidential Fair Housing Policies, supra note I, at 652-53.
332. See text accompanying note 212 supra.
333. See, e.g., J. HOPE, MINORITY ACCESS TO FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID: THE GAP BE-
TWEEN POLICY AND PERFORMANCE 16-28 (1976); Lamb, Administrative Coordination and
Civil Rights Enforcement, supra note 1; Orfield, supra note 266; Taylor, supra note 1, at 984-
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problems in the area of equal employment opportunity. 334 They remain as
major obstacles to effective civil rights implementation in the field of fair
housing, however, although some progress has been initiated.
Title VIII clearly suggests that HUD provide guidance and coordination
to all federal agencies with fair housing responsibilities.335 Yet three years
after the passage of Title VIII, HUD had taken few steps to bring about
coordination. 336 HUD's long-awaited coordination activities utlimately
began to bear a little fruit in the form of an agreement with the General
Services Administration (GSA) to the effect that the two agencies would
work together to insure that low-and moderate-income housing for minori-
ties would have to be available in a community before GSA would locate a
federal facility in that area. In addition, HUD obtained an agreement
from the four federal financial regulatory agencies to send out question-
naires to all the banks and savings and loan institutions that they regulate,
soliciting information on their lending practices involving racial and ethnic
minorities.337 By late 1975, the HUD-GSA agreement was not working as
planned because there had been few efforts to follow specific steps in deter-
mining whether communities where federal facilities were being placed
were actually discriminating in the sale or rental of housing.33 8 On the
other hand, HUD had succeeded in making a new agreement with the
Department of Justice which provided that the two agencies would ex-
change information regarding housing discrimination in various cities
throughout the nation.339 HUD was still referring few cases of housing
discrimination to the Justice Department for prosecution, however, and
the Justice Department was filing lawsuits in only about five to ten percent
of all cases referred to it by HUD.34 °
After eight years of token coordination between HUD and other federal
agencies with fair housing duties, the Commission on Civil Rights released
an extensive report in 1979 detailing HUD's successes and failures.34 ' The
Commission observed that while HUD had succeeded in establishing the
90; Comment, supra note 12, at 843-77; Notre Dame Conference on Federal Civil Rights Leg-
islation and Administration.: A Report, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 906, 921-22 (1966).
334. Lamb, Presidential Leadership, Government Reorganization, and Equal Employment
Opportunity, supra note 1.
335. See note 209 supra.
336. FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 222, at 148-49.
337. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-A REASSESSMENT, supra
note 292, at 36-37.
338. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: To PROVIDE. . . FOR FAIR
HOUSING, supra note 172, at 121-22.
339. Id at 127-28.
340. Id at 128-29.
341. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 213, at 329-33.
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Federal Equal Housing Opportunity Council, the Council was a low HUD
priority and had been inept in coordinating federal fair housing enforce-
ment activities.342 The major project of the Council has been the nurtur-
ing of an Interagency Fair Housing Agreement to insure that minority
federal employees working throughout the country are not discriminated
against. But of the fifty-two Council member agencies, only eight have
entered into the agreement.3 43 Moreover, the Commission complained
that "[t]he Council has not attempted to seek interagency solutions to the
problems of exclusionary zoning, discrimination by the real estate indus-
try, or the need for interagency sharing of compliance information. '"" As
a consequence of inadequate coordination,
there exists no Government-wide system for gathering, storing, or
sharing fair housing information. Thus, there is no mechanism to
prevent duplicative reviews and investigations, to ensure that
participants in one Federal program who violate Title VIII are
not allowed to continue that violation in other Federal programs,
and to enable HUD to be aware of all possible Federal sanctions
when it attempts to conciliate resolution of a Title VI viola-
tion.345
Finally, the problems that had been associated with the HUD-Department
of Justice Agreement in 1975 were still evident, as were coordination
problems between HUD and the Veterans Administration, and HUD and
the Comptroller of the Currency. 346 As things now stand, therefore, not
very much fair housing coordination has been forthcoming, and problems
such as duplication of effort, inconsistent compliance standards, and the
lack of sharing of civil rights data among agencies continue.
H Costs and Benefits of Housing Discrimination
To what extent have the benefits of noncompliance with fair housing
laws outweighed the costs? As suggested earlier,347 the short answer to this
question is that those who have practiced housing discrimination have
rarely experienced any major direct costs, and thus the benefits of noncom-
pliance have been significantly greater than the costs to those actually dis-
criminating. Yet, in a larger sense, cities and their white occupants are hit
by costs of housing discrimination and segregation-primarily the tax bur-
342. Id. at 216.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 216-25.
347. See text accompanying notes 25-45 supra.
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den associated with social services and urban decay that flow directly from
the unhealthy, overcrowded, crime-ridden conditions with which many in-
ner-city minorities have no choice but to live.348
The benefits or advantages of discrimination, in general, have been out-
lined by Bullock and Rodgers.349 Among other things, the advantages in-
clude the fact that the persons and institutions dealing in real estate have
reaped substantial monetary benefits from the practice of blockbusting. 350
Although blockbusting is illegal,35' it vividly illustrates how sizable mone-
tary gains have often accompanied unfair dual-market housing practices.
And as observed earlier,352 many white homeowners also enjoy important
psychological benefits from knowing that they live in communities that are
too expensive for most minorities to relocate in, although in numerous in-
stances racial discrimination and steering, rather than the prices per se, are
responsible for maintaining segregated housing patterns.353
So, why do the benefits of noncompliance continue to outweigh the
costs? The answer, for the most part, lies in the simple fact that federal
agencies with fair housing enforcement duties have rarely utilized sanc-
tions that would make the costs of housing discrimination surpass its ad-
vantages. For example, three years after the passage of Title VI, HUD had
never terminated any of its Title VI funding based upon a finding of dis-
crimination.354 If HUD has been reluctant to cut off Title VI funds that
are housing-related, other federal agencies have undoubtedly been even
less inclined to do so. Without Title VI sanctions being employed, it is
unlikely that state and local governments will take active steps available to
them to insure that housing discrimination does not continue within their
jurisdictions. Benefits of housing discrimination also still surpass costs be-
cause few are found to discriminate under Title VI. While one might as-
sume that HUD would be the federal agency most likely to decide in favor
of Title VI complainants in housing discrimination disputes, findings
against alleged discriminators by HUD have not been commonplace.
Findings of noncompliance, on the average, occurred in only one case in
five in 1974, one in six in 1975, one in nine in 1976, and one in four in
1977. 355 Regarding the percentage of HUD Title VI compliance reviews
348. J. HECHT, supra note 34, at 20-22.
349. C. BULLOCK & H. RODGERS, supra note 1, at 5-6.
350. See text accompanying note 180 supra.
351. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1976).
352. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
353. Hearings, supra note 64, at 166.
354. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: ONE YEAR LATER, supra
note 287, at 42.
355. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 213, at 37.
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resulting in a determination of noncompliance, the figure was thirty-one
percent in 1974, but fell to twenty-one percent in 1975, 1976, and 1977.356
It must be emphasized, too, that Title VI compliance reviews usually are
infrequent and are customarily conducted only when there is clear evi-
dence that housing discrimination is indeed occurring.
Second, concerning Title VIII complaints, one would think that the lead
agency in federal fair housing enforcement would refer a reasonably large
percentage of all such complaints to the Department of Justice for litiga-
tion where HUD has indications that discrimination is actually being prac-
ticed. But "even when HUD has proof of discrimination, respondents may
be unlikely to agree to the remedies HUD suggests because they realize
that if they reject the agreement, the probability of further action against
them is slight. ' '35 7 To illustrate, two years after the enactment of Title
VIII, HUD had referred a mere thirty-three out of some 1500 Title VIII
complaints to the Justice Department, which in turn filed law suits in only
twenty-two of those cases.358 In 1979, eleven years after the passage of
Title VIII, the Justice Department had filed less than thirty Title VIII law-
suits per year, and on the average only three of these thirty cases had been
referred to Justice by HUD.35 9
The moral of the story is that the Justice Department is not prone to
initiate litigation against most of those who appear to be engaging in hous-
ing discrimination, and strict administrative sanctions by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development-or any other federal agency-are
even less likely to be imposed. Nor can we expect widespread voluntary
compliance, or for the vast majority of white communities to accept federal
inducements in the form of additional funds to build subsidized housing
that could be used in part to provide minorities with a chance to disperse
throughout larger metropolitan areas. Under present conditions, then,
there is little hope that the nation's fair housing laws will be enforced with
any substantial degree of vigor. Without noncompliance being swiftly but
fairly penalized, the perceived benefits of housing discrimination will con-
tinue to far outweigh the costs.
I Attitudes and Actions of Beneficiaries and Interest Groups
Those who benefit most directly from attempts to fight housing discrimi-
nation and segregation are of course minorities. It must, however, be em-
356. Id at 39.
357. Id at 31.
358. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: ONE YEAR LATER, supra
note 287, at 146.
359. THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 213, at 31.
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phasized that other groups derive advantages from the fulfillment of fair
housing goals. They include developers, unions, and employers who
would gain from greater dispersal of minorities into the suburbs.
Builders and their organizations have an interest in eliminating
suburban obstacles so they can build more housing and make
more money. Unions have an interest in getting housing near job
sites for their workers. Companies need workers who stay on the
job and can get there consistently. These and other groups will
increasingly feel the need to see to it that housing for low- and
moderate-income families is provided, in quantity, in subur-
bia.360
In seeking the benefits of fair housing, some individuals, on their own,
have at times made their political weight felt. This is especially true with
regard to civil rights activists who, despite physical intimidation or force,
have overtly protested unfair housing practices to bring discrimination to
the public's attention. Individual activists have also filed lawsuits, even
when they often lacked adequate resources, and have taken other efforts to
jar federal, state, and local government officials out of their stupor of com-
placency. On the other hand, there is only so much that individuals can
accomplish in the field of fair housing. When "victory" at the individual
level finally emerges, if in fact it does, it is often too late and the pay-off is
usually too small.
It is axiomatic then that mass protests or other forms of collective action
have more widespread consequences than individuals acting on their own
to protect their rights.36' The resources and bargaining power of individu-
als simply do not approximate that of groups in most cases. As the old
saying goes, there is indeed power in numbers, and a more credible threat
can be lodged against the status quo when minorities band together to air
their grievances and to voice their demands. Therefore, the more critical
role that individual beneficiaries can play is through active participation in
civil rights interest groups and by providing support for civil rights organi-
zations.362
The civil rights organizations that have been most vigorous in pursuit of
the goal of equal housing opportunity include the National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing and the Suburban Action Institute.
They have received some help from more general purpose civil rights orga-
nizations such as the NAACP, the Southern Christian Leadership Confer-
ence, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and the Center for
360. L. RUBINOWITZ, supra note 23, at 3.
361. See, e.g., T. DYE, supra note 195, at 113-16.
362. Id
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National Policy Review. These organizations also have attempted to culti-
vate alliances with developers, unions, employers and other potential ben-
eficiaries.
Regarding civil rights organizations, Rubinowitz has asserted that there
is "a significant movement to alter the residential [segregated] patterns in
our suburbs. '36 3 But his statement deserves a bit of analysis here. To the
extent that a few dedicated groups have taken political and legal action at
the federal, state, and local levels to fight discrimination, this "movement"
can be considered a noteworthy departure from earlier years when there
was a paucity of interest group activity pushing for fair housing. One
might, however, go a step further. Whether such groups have had a""sig-
nificant" impact on eliminating unfair housing practices is quite another
question. Most likely those commendable souls who work so hard and
endlessly for such private groups as the National Committee Against Dis-
crimination in Housing, the Suburban Action Institute, the Center for Na-
tional Policy Review, and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
believe that their impact is significant. Yet the extent of their impact, how-
ever praiseworthy, certainly does not and cannot come close to matching
the potential consequences of effective fair housing enforcement by the
federal bureaucracy. Instead, such groups are most influential in devoting
their limited resources to selected litigation that has the prospects for wide-
spread change in housing segregation and discrimination. Without in any
way detracting from the importance of the role that such groups perform,
their impact still must be judged as a supplementary, secondary means of
eliminating unfair housing policies and practices throughout the nation.
True change will ultimately come only with forceful federal executive
branch involvement.
Ill. CONCLUSION
In closing, it is appropriate to refer again to the national disgrace which
I initially asserted to exist in America. 3" Obvious factors distinguish mi-
nority from white communities, including overcrowded and over-priced
housing, decay and unsanitary conditions, high rates of crime, vandalism
and juvenile delinquency, and general inequities in the quality and quanti-
ty of governmental services. These conditions stem largely from past and
present housing discrimination practiced by real estate interests, financial
institutions, local governments, and individual white homeowners. For
most of the minority population, the average suburbs remain closed for
363. L. RUBINOWITZ, supra note 23, at 2.
364. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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purposes of buying or renting a home close to new employment opportuni-
ties and better financed educational systems. By examining the variables
in part two, it should be clear beyond a doubt that the federal government
has consistently dragged its feet in fighting housing discrimination and
segregation in America. In other words, the legal response has fallen far
short of its goal. Yet federal administrative agencies must be heavily relied
upon to bring about effective resolutions to these problems in the future,
with the support of the White House, Congress, and the federal courts.
Much, much more aggressive enforcement is required if the disgraceful
and tragic picture painted in part one is to be replaced by a mosaic of
equal housing opportunity for all Americans.
